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ABSTRACT
Cognitive theory of obsessions hypothesizes that faulty appraisals of intrusive thoughts
are paramount in the development and persistence of obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD). Types of faulty appraisals include interpretations of excessive responsibility for
preventing an adverse outcome (responsibility), appraisals of exaggerated personal
importance (importance of thoughts), and interpretations that focus on having total
control over one's own thoughts (control of thoughts). Previous research suggests that
importance and control of thoughts appraisals (Ferguson, Jarry, & Jackson, 2006) and
beliefs (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005) are better described as
one construct. Although there are numerous experimental studies suggesting that
appraisals of excessive responsibility lead to more severe OCD symptoms, only two have
demonstrated this effect with importance of thoughts appraisals (Teachman, Woody, &
Magee, 2006; Teachman & Clerkin, 2007), and none have experimentally examined the
combined effect of importance appraisals and efforts at mental control. The present
research investigates the impact of an experimental manipulation of importance
appraisals and attempts at mental control on the severity of OCD associated
manifestations. Participants had an unwanted mental intrusion provoked through the use
of a well-established intrusive thought provocation procedure (Rachman, Shafran,
Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman, 1996). Appraisals of importance were experimentally
manipulated by systematically varying information given to participants about having an
intrusive thought (i.e., whether it is meaningful or not). Attempts at mental control were
manipulated using a thought suppression task, as suppression is a common strategy used
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by people in response to an intrusive thought in order to regain mental control. Results
revealed that participants who were exposed to importance interpretations, and those who
were not given any feedback about their intrusive thought (Control group), reported more
severe dysfunctional appraisals of importance and mental control, as well as higher levels
of OCD associated symptoms than did those who had their intrusive thought normalized.
Participants who were instructed to exercise mental control via thought suppression did
not report more severe levels of obsessive-compulsive symptoms than did those who
were not given such instructions. Finally, the findings clearly suggest that
psychoeducational information to normalize mental intrusions is beneficial.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Context of the Problem
Individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suffer from symptoms
that can be extremely tormenting, debilitating, and time consuming. The World Health
Organization (WHO) rated OCD as the tenth leading cause of disability in the world
(WHO, 1996). OCD was once thought to be a rare mental disorder with initial prevalence
ratings of 0.05% (Rudin, 1952, as cited in Antony, Downie, & Swinson, 1998). However,
findings of a Canadian epidemiological study suggest that OCD is a relatively common
mental disorder, with an estimated lifetime prevalence rate of 3% in the general
population (Bland, Orn, & Newman, 1988). Results from the Epidemiological Catchment
Area study estimated lifetime prevalence rates to be between 1.9 and 3.3% (Karno,
Golding, Sorenson, & Burnam, 1988). A more recent study conducted by Weissman et al.
(1994) found the lifetime prevalence of OCD to be within this range at approximately
2.3%. In adult clinical samples, the ratio of males to females is approximately 1 : 1 and
males tend to have an earlier age of onset compared to women (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000).
Definitional/Conceptual Issues
Obsessions
The most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, text revision (DSM-IV-TR) defines obsessions as "persistent ideas, thoughts,
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impulses, or images that are experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause
marked anxiety or distress" (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 457). Examples
of obsessions include impulses to harm a loved one, thoughts of being contaminated, and
repeated doubts that one left an appliance plugged in and consequently that one's house
will catch fire. Obsessions are distinguished from worry in that the latter are experienced
as ego-syntonic and are usually focussed on real life concerns, such as family, work, or
finances, whereas obsessions are experienced as intrusive and are less focussed on normal
experiences of everyday life (Turner, Beidel, & Stanley, 1992). Furthermore, worry tends
to take the form of ordinary thoughts whereas obsessions may take the form of thoughts,
images, or impulses (Turner et al., 1992). For the sake of parsimony, the term "intrusive
thoughts" is used throughout this document to refer to all types of cognitive intrusions
(i.e., thoughts, impulses, or images).
Compulsions
Compulsions are defined in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association,
2000) as "repetitive behaviours (e.g., hand washing, ordering, checking) or mental acts
(e.g., praying, counting, repeating words silently) the goal of which is to prevent or
reduce anxiety or distress, not to provide pleasure or gratification" (p. 457). Examples of
common compulsions include excessively cleaning oneself to wash away or prevent
perceived contamination, repeatedly checking the stove to ensure the dials are turned off
so as to prevent a fire from occurring, and repeating a certain phrase over and over.
Compulsions are distinct from impulse control disorders (e.g., pathological gambling,
kleptomania, pyromania), which also involve engaging in repetitive behaviours, in that
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compulsions are designed to reduce risk and avoid harm or distress whereas impulsive
behaviours involve risk taking and are engaged in for more pleasurable purposes, at least
in the short term (Veale, 2003).
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
OCD is categorized as an anxiety disorder in the DSM-IV-TR (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). The rationale for this classification is that obsessive
thoughts engender a feeling of anxiety and discomfort. Compulsions are typically
performed in order to neutralize such anxiety and discomfort. The criteria in the DSM-IVTR require sufferers to experience clinically significant obsessions and/or compulsions in
order to be diagnosed with OCD. This means that the obsessions and/or compulsions
must cause marked anxiety or distress or have a significantly adverse impact one's social
and/or occupational functioning. Typical OCD presentations involve the presence of
obsessions and compulsions, although conjoint presentation is not required for a
diagnosis of OCD. In rare instances, individuals with OCD may have obsessions without
compulsions, or compulsions in the absence of obsessions (de Silva & Rachman, 1998;
Mayerovitch, du Fort, Kakuma, Bland, Newman, & Pinard, 2003).
Behavioural Conceptualization of OCD
The behavioural conceptualization of OCD stems from Mowrer's (1960) twofactor theory that describes how classical and operant conditioning combine to facilitate
the onset and maintenance of fear. This theory is not specific to OCD but it does help
provide an understanding of the manner by which anxiety develops and persists in OCD.
Mowrer posits that fear is first acquired through classical conditioning whereby the onset
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of a specific fear, referred to as a conditioned response (CR), occurs when a conditioned
stimulus (CS) is paired with a naturally aversive stimulus, referred to as an unconditioned
stimulus (US). For example, a child may learn to fear (CR) a teddy bear (CS) if the
presence of the teddy bear coincides often enough with a loud, unpleasant noise (US).
Eventually the presence of the teddy bear will elicit the fear response because it will be
associated with the aversive stimulus, in this case, the unpleasant noise. Operant
conditioning contributes to the maintenance of the fear response. According to Mowrer, a
fear response engenders motivational efforts to reduce the uncomfortable state. Any
behaviour that works to reduce the level of fear (e.g., escape or avoidance) is reinforced
because of its success in temporarily reducing or eliminating the fear. Despite the shortterm effectiveness of escape or avoidance behaviours to reduce fear, such behaviours
contribute to the maintenance of the fear in the long term because they prevent the
extinction of the CR. That is, these behaviours prevent the opportunity for one to be
exposed to his or her feared stimulus for an extended period of time and to habituate to
the stimulus. Repeated exposure to the CS without presentation of the US leads to
extinction of the CR.
Mowrer's (1960) two-factor theory can be used in a more specific manner to
conceptualize the onset and persistence of OCD. Upon occurrence of an intrusive
thought, individuals with OCD experience anxiety or distress. They learn to reduce the
anxiety initially by escaping and in the future by avoiding fearful stimuli. They may also
engage in compulsive rituals in order to reduce their anxiety. The success of the
compulsive rituals and avoidance behaviours in mitigating or eliminating the anxiety and
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distress is reinforcing and increases the probability that such behaviour will recur in the
future. Individuals come to think that they avoided negative consequences (e.g., their
feared thought coming true) by engaging in compulsive rituals or escaping/avoiding
situations associated with their obsessions. The cycle of fear in response to obsessions,
followed by compulsions or escape/avoidance behaviours is maintained because engaging
in these behaviours precludes the opportunity to habituate to the anxiety and to
disconfirm faulty beliefs.
Because of this pattern, individuals with OCD never have the opportunity to learn
that the feared events will not happen and that their anxiety or distress will eventually
subside without engaging in compulsive rituals or escaping the situation. For example, a
person begins to have intrusive thoughts that he/she will be contaminated and
subsequently, will become gravely ill. The individual experiences anxiety and fear when
he/she has these repetitive intrusive thoughts of becoming contaminated by germs. Upon
feeling contaminated, the individual engages in repetitive and excessive washing rituals
to rid him/herself of any possible contamination. The individual also attempts to avoid
situations that are perceived to be of elevated risk for contamination. The compulsive
rituals and avoidance behaviour prove effective (at least in the short-term) in reducing the
anxiety experienced from the intrusive thoughts of contamination. Thus, these behaviours
are negatively reinforced because they are successful in reducing anxiety. This negative
reinforcement is also implicated in landmark cognitive conceptualizations of OCD as
being a key contributor in the persistence of OC symptoms (Rachman, 1998; Salkovskis,
1989). The person's continual avoidance and compulsive rituals prevent the extinction of
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the fear because the individual does not have an opportunity to be exposed to their fears
in the absence of their anticipated consequences. Repeated exposure to situations in
which the individual feels contaminated in the absence of performing any compulsions or
escaping the situation would help the individual habituate to the fear and disconfirm any
faulty beliefs that he/she will become contaminated in situations in which dirt and germs
are present.
This behavioural conceptualization of OCD proved to be tremendously influential
as it led to a type of treatment called exposure and response prevention (ERP) whereby
individuals are systematically exposed to the feared situations that provoke their
obsessional thoughts while they simultaneously refrain from carrying out their
compulsive rituals (Meyer, 1966). The rationale for this method of treatment is to allow
OCD sufferers to disconfirm the feared consequences associated with not performing
their compulsions. Although ERP has proven to be an effective treatment for many
people with OCD, a substantial proportion of sufferers (20-30 percent of individuals)
refuse this intense method of treatment and of those who complete ERP treatment,
approximately 25 percent fail to improve (see Clark, 2004 for more on the limitations of
ERP). Additionally, this conceptualization does not adequately account for the cognitive
biases present in OCD (Clark, 2004). For these reasons, gaining further understanding of
OCD was necessary to improve treatment methods for the disorder.
Cognitive Conceptualization of OCD
The development of the cognitive theory of OCD largely stems from the seminal
work of Rachman and de Silva (1978), who examined obsessional thoughts in a sample
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of individuals with OCD and in a non-clinical sample. Findings from their landmark
study revealed that 80% of non-clinical participants experienced intrusive thoughts or
impulses. Furthermore, the intrusive thoughts reported by the non-clinical participants
were indistinguishable in content and form (i.e., thoughts or impulses) from those
experienced by the sample of individuals with OCD. However, those with OCD reported
greater frequency and intensity of intrusions and heightened difficulties in their ability to
successfully dismiss the unwanted thoughts. This was the first study to suggest that
intrusive thoughts are not specific to individuals with OCD, but rather are a universal
phenomenon. These results were later replicated by Salkovskis and Harrison (1984), who
found an even higher prevalence of intrusive thoughts (88%) in non-clinical participants.
The finding that intrusive thoughts are not specific to people with OCD made it
clear that the presence of such thoughts was not the central factor in determining whether
an individual developed OCD. Rather, cognitive-behavioural theorists suggest that how
individuals appraise (interpret) their intrusive thoughts largely influences whether or not
they will develop OCD-related problems (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Rachman, 1997,1998;
Salkovskis, 1985,1989). These theorists believe that individuals prone to developing
OCD make maladaptive appraisals of their intrusive thoughts. Although there appears to
be agreement on the central role of faulty intrusive thought appraisals in the development
and maintenance of OCD, various theorists have implicated different types of faulty
appraisals in the development of the disorder. These different types of maladaptive
intrusive thought appraisals, and the research that supports them, will be reviewed below.
Nevertheless, restructuring faulty appraisals is the central focus in cognitive therapy for
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OCD.
Behavioural Versus Cognitive Treatment of OCD
McLean et al. (2001) conducted a treatment study comparing ERP (behaviourally
focussed treatment) and cognitive therapy for OCD in group format. The goal of ERP was
to help patients extinguish the fears via repeated gradual exposures to their feared
situations. The focus of cognitive therapy was to identify and restructure faulty appraisals
of intrusive thoughts and obsessional beliefs. Results indicated that both treatments were
more effective than a control condition and ERP was marginally more effective than
cognitive therapy in reducing the severity of OCD symptoms. This marginal difference
persisted at 3-month follow-up. Whittal, Robichaud, Thordarson, and McLean (2008)
reported on a two-year follow-up study evaluating the effectiveness of ERP and cognitive
therapy for OCD, in both individual and group formats. Findings revealed that both
treatments had a similar positive impact on the reduction of OCD symptoms in
individualized treatment. However, in group format, those patients who underwent ERP
endorsed less severe OCD symptoms at 2-year follow-up compared to those who
underwent cognitive therapy. Whittal et al. (2008) report that OCD treatments have not
continued to improve over time. Further understanding of the cognitive mechanisms
associated with OCD may help to overcome this apparent plateau in treatment outcome.
Cognitive-Behavioural Theory of Obsessions: Responsibility
Salkovskis (1985, 1989) postulates that intrusive thought appraisals that increase
one's likelihood of developing OCD symptoms are those in which the individual
interprets him or herself as being responsible for the occurrence of the intrusive thought
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and/or as being responsible for the perceived harmful consequences (content) associated
with the thought. In the context of faulty intrusive thought appraisals, Salkovskis defined
responsibility as,
The belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent
subjectively crucial negative outcomes. These outcomes are perceived as essential
to prevent. They may be actual, that is, having consequences in the real world,
and/or at a moral level (cited in Salkovskis et al., 2000, p. 350).
Upon the occurrence of an intrusive thought, individuals with OCD experience an
inflated perception of responsibility to prevent some perceived negative outcome.
Neutralizing rituals, whether overt (e.g., checking) or covert (e.g., praying), are performed
in order to prevent harm or negative consequences from befalling the self or others and/or
to reduce one's sense of responsibility (Salkovskis, 1989; Salkovskis & Wahl, 2003).
These neutralizing behaviours contribute to the persistence of the disorder because they
prevent the opportunity for rigid responsibility-related beliefs to be disconfirmed. That is,
by engaging in neutralizing behaviour, one will not see that his or her feared thought will
not actually happen. Instead, failure of the feared thought to come to fruition is attributed
to having performed the neutralizing rituals, which are subsequently reinforced.
Individuals with OCD typically feel that if their feared thought (impulse, image) actually
occurs in the real world, it will be their fault because they failed to prevent it (e.g., by not
checking enough, or cleaning enough, etc.). This superstitious type of thinking often
precedes compulsive behaviours. In fact, individuals who never present for treatment
often engage in superstitious behaviour that is similar to that of persons with OCD, the
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difference being that the latter group finds it to be significantly more distressing
(Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). Finally, Salkovskis (1985) theorizes that thoughts about
intrusions in which a perceived feeling of personal responsibility is absent are unlikely to
be followed by compulsive rituals because there would be no reason to perform such
rituals (i.e., no anxiety/distress would be present if the intrusive thought was appraised
adaptively).
Empirical Support for the Cognitive-Behavioural Theory of Obsessions. The
concept of inflated responsibility has received extensive empirical support. Rachman
(1993) acknowledged the importance of the relationship between responsibility appraisals
and OCD symptoms and stated that a sense of inflated responsibility is particularly
common in individuals who compulsively engage in checking rituals. In an experimental
study, Lopatka and Rachman (1995) examined whether changes in perceived level of
responsibility are causally related to compulsive checking. Individuals with OCD were
randomly assigned to a high or low responsibility condition, or to one of two control
conditions. Perceived level of responsibility was manipulated through instructions
provided by the experimenter. These instructions were presented to participants prior to
exposure to a situation in which they would typically engage in excessive checking
behaviour. Participants in the low responsibility condition were informed that the
experimenter would take foil responsibility for anything that would happen during the
task, whereas participants in the high responsibility condition were told that they were
folly responsible for anything that might happen during the task as a result of them not
checking. The control groups were not provided with any responsibility-related
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information. The results demonstrated support for Salkovskis' (1985,1989) theory in that
individuals in the low responsibility group (who had their perceived level of
responsibility decreased) reported significantly lower levels of distress and urges to
engage in checking behaviours compared to the control groups. Furthermore, a trend
towards significance was present as inflating participants' perceived level of
responsibility appeared to increase their distress (p = .10) and desire to engage in
checking behaviours {p = .10) compared to those that were not exposed to a responsibility
manipulation. Lopatka and Rachman (1995) argue that this lack of significant finding
may be attributable to participants' (i.e., individuals with OCD) already elevated levels of
responsibility, thus resulting in a ceiling effect.
In a study conducted to assess the role of perfectionism and responsibility in
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, a sample of undergraduate students completed
measures of perfectionism, responsibility, and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms.
Responsibility was a better predictor of OC symptoms than was perfectionism, although
the latter accounted for a significant proportion of unique variance (Rheaume, Freeston,
Dugas, Letarte, & Ladouceur, 1995).
Ladouceur et al. (1995) conducted an experimental study in which responsibility
in a non-clinical sample was manipulated. Participants were randomly assigned to a high
responsibility or low responsibility condition. In the high responsibility condition,
participants were falsely told that the research lab was mandated by a pharmaceutical
company to improve classification of medicinal capsules to facilitate distribution to
individuals suffering from a serious virus in another country. They were specifically
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informed that their accurate classification of various coloured capsules could directly
affect the production of the capsules. Alternatively, participants in the low responsibility
condition were informed only that the researchers were interested in the perception of
colours and that their performance was a practice trial before the real study began.
Overall, participants in the high responsibility group were found to exhibit significantly
more hesitations, overt checking behaviours, anxiety, and reported a higher level of
perceived responsibility than did those in the low responsibility group.
Bouchard, Rheaume, and Ladouceur (1999) conducted another experimental study
investigating the impact of varying levels of responsibility appraisals on OC symptoms in
individuals with varying levels of perfectionism. Participants were assigned to either the
highly perfectionistic or moderately perfectionistic group based on their scores on a
measure of perfectionism. Participants were then randomly assigned to a either a low
responsibility condition, in which they were asked to complete a task and told that the
results were of no importance, or a high responsibility condition in which participants
were instructed to complete an important task that would have a significant impact on
many people. Findings indicated that those in the high responsibility group showed a
greater frequency of checking behaviour than did those in the low responsibility group.
Additional results indicated that in the high responsibility condition, those who were
highly perfectionistic reported higher levels of perceived personal responsibility for
negative outcomes than did the moderately perfectionistic group. These findings suggest
that responsibility appraisals are related to OCD symptoms and that highly perfectionistic
individuals are more likely than others to make such appraisals.
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Findings of a treatment study revealed that cognitive therapy aimed at reducing
one's perceived level of responsibility significantly reduced OCD symptoms in a clinical
sample high on compulsive checking (Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume, & Dube, 1996). This
finding was particularly impressive in light of the fact that the therapy focussed solely on
changing maladaptive appraisals of inflated responsibility, without any exposure and
response prevention. Nevertheless, these individuals experienced clinically significant
reductions in their level of perceived responsibility and the severity of their OCD
symptoms.
In a controlled study by Foa, Amir, Bogert, Molnar, and Prezworski (2001) that
examined responsibility, individuals with OCD were compared with social phobia
sufferers and non-clinical controls. Participants completed the Obsessive Compulsive
Responsibility Scale, a self-report scale designed to measure the perceived level of
responsibility in individuals in low- and high-risk situations as well as in situations that
are specifically relevant to OCD. The OCD group demonstrated inflated responsibility
compared to the non-clinical and social phobia groups in low-risk and OC-relevant
situations. Alternatively, no group differences emerged in high-risk situations. This
finding may be a result of non-clinical individuals reporting increased levels of
responsibility for high-risk situations while individuals with OCD were already high,
possibly resulting in a ceiling effect.
Foa, Sacks, Tolin, Prezworski, and Amir (2002) conducted further research on
perceived levels of responsibility and checking behaviours. Participants consisted of a
group of individuals with OCD who engaged in checking compulsions (OC checkers),
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individuals with an OCD diagnosis but who did not engage in checking rituals (OC noncheckers), and a non-clinical group. Results indicated that the group of OC checkers
reported greater urges to rectify situations, greater feelings of relief upon doing so, and
higher perceived responsibility for preventing harm than did the non-clinical group in
situations that were deemed to be of low- and moderate-risk. OC checkers endorsed
greater urges to rectify situations, greater relief when doing so in low- and moderate-risk
situations and higher perceived inflated responsibility in moderate-risk situations
compared to OC non-checkers. OC non-checkers did not score significantly different
from the non-clinical group on any of the dependent variables. These findings suggest
that responsibility is useful in conceptualizing the development and maintenance of OC
checking behaviour. Foa, Sacks et al., (2002) suggest that responsibility may have less
explanatory power for the broad scope of OCD presentations (e.g., washers, orderers,
hoarders, etc.). However, there is empirical evidence to suggest that faulty interpretations
of inflated responsibility are as relevant to OC washers as they are to OC checkers. For
example, Wilson and Chambless (1999) failed to find any significant difference between
correlations of OC checking and OC washing measures with measures of responsibility,
using a sample of non-clinical individuals. Such findings contradict the assertions of Foa,
Sacks et al. and suggest that appraisals of responsibility are also present in washers.
Providing further support for the influence of responsibility appraisals on
symptoms of OCD, Salkovskis et al. (2000) found that patients with OCD (unspecified
subtypes) experienced more responsibility interpretations than did anxious and nonclinical control groups and they were more likely to endorse general responsibility beliefs.
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Furthermore, Williams, Salkovskis, Forrester, and Allsopp (2002) conducted a pilot study
in which six adolescents with various OCD subtypes (e.g., washers, checkers, etc.)
received cognitive-behavioural therapy whereby faulty appraisals of inflated
responsibility were targeted. Results indicated that reductions in perceived level of
responsibility coincided with a less severe levels of OC symptoms.
Breakdown of Mental Control Theory of Obsessions: Control of Thoughts
Clark and Purdon (1993) emphasize the prominent role of intrusive thought
appraisals in the onset and maintenance of OCD and suggest that less emphasis should be
placed on appraisals of responsibility. Instead, they believe that obsessions arise when an
individual perceives him or herself as no longer having mental control. Clark and Purdon
(1993) postulate that individuals prone to developing OCD have dysfunctional thought
control beliefs whereby they exaggerate the extent to which they should be in control of
their own thoughts. These dysfunctional thought control beliefs are hypothesized to be
quite stringent in that individuals with these beliefs think that they should be in control of
their thoughts at all times. According to this theory of obsessions, those who have these
faulty thought control beliefs appraise the occurrence of intrusive thoughts as
unacceptable and they attempt to suppress them. Research has demonstrated that attempts
at thought suppression actually have a paradoxical effect resulting in an increase in the
occurrence of the intrusion (Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Wegner, Schneider, Carter III,
& White, 1987). Therefore, attempts at suppressing intrusive thoughts are liable to fail
with a resulting increase in thought occurrence. According to Clark and Purdon (1993),
individuals prone to obsessions perceive these failed attempts at thought suppression as
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indicating that they have lost mental control. Although this theory of obsessions puts little
focus on the development of compulsions, Clark and Purdon (1993) do posit that
compulsive rituals arise as a final attempt to gain control over cognitive intrusions.
A case example will be used to demonstrate how obsessions might develop
according to the theory proposed by Clark and Purdon (1993). An individual who holds
the belief that it is extremely important to be in control of one's own thoughts
experiences an intrusive impulse to drive his/her car into oncoming traffic. The person
interprets this thought as being unacceptable, and as an indicator that he/she is not in
control of his/her mind. This leads to attempts to suppress this impulse, however, this
makes the thought more salient which results in the person experiencing this intrusive
impulse more often. Repeated failed attempts at thought suppression suggest to the
individual that he/she has lost control of his/her thought processes. As a final attempt to
gain more control over the unwanted impulse he/she compulsively repeats the phrase "I
am not losing my mind." This example demonstrates how maladaptive appraisals
involving the excessive need to always be in control of one's own mind contribute to the
onset of OC symptoms.
Empirical Support for the Breakdown of Mental Control Theory of Obsessions.
Clark and Purdon's (1993) conceptualization has received empirical support. For
instance, non-clinical participants holding the belief that they need to be in control of
their thoughts have been shown to exhibit more severe symptoms of OCD compared to
individuals who do not hold such a belief (Purdon & Clark, 1994). Furthermore, Clark,
Purdon, and Wang (2003) found that beliefs about the negative consequences of being
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unable to control one's thoughts were significant predictors of the frequency of
obsessions.
Purdon, Rowa, and Antony (2005) examined the effects of thought suppression in
a sample of individuals with OCD. Participants initially completed a measure of intrusive
thought appraisals and they were subsequently asked to identify their most upsetting
mental intrusion. Participants' most distressing intrusive thought was then primed further
by instructing them to think of a scene that involved the intrusion for a 30-second period.
Then they were exposed to either a thought suppression or a non-suppression condition.
Findings indicated an absence of any paradoxical effect of thought suppression. However,
recurrences of one's intrusive thought during a second thought monitoring period led to
negative appraisals about one's inability to control his or her thoughts. Such controlrelated appraisals predicted distress caused by thought occurrences, lowered mood, and
more intense thought suppression efforts.
Cognitive Theory of Obsessions: Importance of Thoughts
Rachman (1997,1998) proposed that individuals with OCD catastrophically
misinterpret the significance of their intrusive thoughts by attaching excessive personal
significance to their intrusions. Attaching undue personal importance to intrusions results
in them becoming more salient and meaningful by way of being personally relevant,
threatening, and revealing of the person's character (Rachman, 1997). According to
Rachman (1997), obsessions will persist as long as the faulty interpretations persist, and
will diminish as the perceived importance of such thoughts lessen. Additionally, the
tendency to appraise intrusive thoughts in a personally-relevant, catastrophic manner,
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increases one's propensity to develop OCD whereas the tendency to make adaptive
intrusive thought appraisals, in which intrusions are not interpreted as catastrophic,
decreases the likelihood of developing OC symptoms.
A case example is presented here to demonstrate the onset and persistence of OC
symptoms according to the theory proposed by Rachman (1997,1998). An individual
who attends church regularly begins to have an intrusive impulse to blurt out an obscene
remark in church. He/she interprets this to mean that he/she is a disgusting person. This
misinterpretation of the intrusion increases the range of distressing stimuli because
certain neutral stimuli now become threatening, as they become associated with both
negative appraisals about what his/her intrusive impulse means about him/her as a person
and anxiety (Rachman, 1998). For instance, the individual not only experiences fear while
at church, but also fears going to social events with members of his/her church or even
driving past the church, because these situations trigger the same type of intrusive
impulses (and negative personally-relevant appraisals) that the person experiences while
at church. With increased stimuli provoking the intrusive thoughts, those thoughts
become increasingly salient and occur more often, and ultimately develop into obsessions
(Rachman, 1998). According to Rachman (1998), maladaptive interpretations of feared
stimuli leads to avoidance of the stimuli. Repeated avoidance prevents the opportunity to
disconfirm inaccurate interpretations. That is, the person who continually avoids church
because of the intrusive impulses he/she experiences while there, never gives him/herself
a chance to learn that were he/she to remain at church for an extended period of time,
he/she would not actually blurt out an obscene remark. Additionally, without the
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knowledge that intrusive thoughts are a universal phenomenon, the individual may
continue to think that his/her intrusions represent some sort of character flaw. Thus, the
obsessional thoughts persist. Rachman (1997,1998) argues that when the
misinterpretation is reduced or eliminated, the feared stimuli are converted into neutral
stimuli. Thus, the chance of provoking the obsessional thought is drastically reduced
thereby lowering or eliminating the occurrence of the obsession.
Empirical Support for the Cognitive Theory of Obsessions. Rachman's (1997,
1998) theory that individuals prone to developing OCD attach excessive personallyrelated importance to their intrusive thoughts has received empirical support. Findings
from Rachman and de Silva's (1978) landmark study demonstrated that almost all people
appraise their mental intrusions as having personally significant meaning and most
appraise their intrusions as being in contradiction to their normal self. In accordance with
this, individuals reporting on their most upsetting intrusive thought have indicated that
the thought contradicted valued aspects of the self to a greater extent than did individuals
who reported on their least distressing intrusion (Rowa & Purdon, 2003). Additionally,
ratings about the personally-relevant meaning attached to intrusive thoughts predict the
frequency of obsessional thoughts (Clark & Claybourn, 1997).
Studies by Teachman and colleagues (Teachman & Clerkin, 2007; Teachman,
Woody, & Magee, 2006), which attempted to experimentally manipulate importance of
thoughts appraisals in a non-clinical sample, have found partial support for the cognitive
theory of obsessions proposed by Rachman (1997,1998). Teachman et al.'s (2006) study
was the first to attempt to experimentally manipulate importance of thoughts appraisals.
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Prior to the manipulation, participants completed measures to assess pre-existing severity
of depressive and OC symptoms, as well as beliefs about obsessions. Thereafter,
participants were asked to recall previously experienced mental intrusions and then they
were randomly assigned to receive an importance or a meaningless manipulation, or were
assigned to a control group. Those in the importance condition were told (falsely) that
their intrusive thoughts said a lot about them as a person. Individuals in the meaningless
condition were informed that their intrusions lack any significance, while those in the
control group were simply told to think about their intrusive thoughts. Participants then
completed self-report measures to assess explicit appraisals and a computer task used to
assess implicit appraisals of their intrusive thoughts. Participants were provided with
definitional information about intrusive thoughts and were primed to recollect some of
their own previously experienced intrusive thoughts. They were informed that they would
not be asked to share their specific intrusive thoughts. Participants were then randomly
assigned to one of three conditions: importance, meaningless, or a control condition.
In the importance condition, the experimenter told participants that their intrusive
thoughts were important and might reflect their personal values. In contrast, participants
in the meaningless condition were informed that their intrusive thoughts were
meaningless and unrelated to their personal values. Participants in the control condition
were not given any information about their intrusive thoughts. All participants completed
an association task on a computer in order to examine implicit (i.e., automatic,
involuntary) appraisals of intrusive thoughts. Then participants completed a self-report
scale to assess the perceived level of personal significance (i.e., importance appraisals)
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they attached to the intrusions.
As expected, the strongest implicit associations of intrusive thoughts and
importance were found in participants in the importance condition. Contrary to
expectations, no group differences were found on an explicit measure of the personal
significance one attaches to intrusive thoughts. That is, according to the self-report
information provided, participants in the importance condition did not attach more
personal significance to their intrusive thoughts than those in the meaningless or control
conditions. No differences were found between the meaningless and control groups on
implicit or explicit measures, which is consistent with the cognitive model of obsessions
in that healthy individuals are expected to interpret the occurrence of the intrusive thought
in a relatively harmless and unimportant fashion (Teachman et al. 2006). It is important to
note that the authors indicated that their manipulation check was not significant and,
therefore, they concluded that they could not be certain as to whether or not the
experimental manipulation caused participants to appraise their intrusive thoughts in a
different manner (although the importance manipulation did appear to have an effect on
implicit appraisals).
Teachman and Clerkin (2007) employed the same methodology as Teachman et
al., (2006) to further investigate the impact of importance-related appraisals on
obsessional thought patterns. Participants' explicit appraisals of personal significance and
their state self-esteem ratings were predicted by pre-existing beliefs about obsessions, but
not by the experimental importance manipulation. Alternatively, participants' scores on
the measure of implicit appraisals was predicted by the interaction of certain pre-existing
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obsessional beliefs (the need to be certain and the perceived importance of thoughts) and
the importance manipulation. The authors indicated that there may be distinct predictors
of implicit and explicit appraisals of mental intrusions. However, they also noted that
explicit appraisals, which are measured via self-report, could have been controlled by
participants. That is, participants may have responded to demand characteristics and
voluntarily controlled their responses in a more socially desirable fashion. This
explanation would not apply to implicit appraisals, which are deemed to be outside one's
level of conscious control. Again, these results partially support the cognitive theory of
obsessions proposed by Rachman (1997,1998) in that the manipulation of interpretations
of intrusive thoughts influenced implicit appraisals.
One shortcoming of the studies conducted by Teachman and colleagues
(Teachman & Clerkin, 2007; Teachman et al., 2006) may have been that the researchers
did not use a measure that has sufficient sensitivity to assess state OC symptoms and
appraisals. They used the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory - Revised (Foa, Huppert et al.,
2002) which was not designed to measure state-like OC symptoms. Further, the Personal
Significance Scale (Rachman, 2001, as cited in Teachman et al., 2006) used to assess
importance appraisals of intrusive thoughts had untested psychometric properties,
particularly with respect to whether it is sensitive to state effects (Teachman et al., 2006).
Also, it remains to be seen whether individuals exposed to an importance manipulation
would experience more severe levels of compulsive behaviour than individuals not
exposed to such a manipulation.
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Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group and Importance/Control Appraisals
In 1995 an international group of experts on OCD collaborated to form the
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG) in order to develop
common methods of assessing cognitive aspects of OCD. They developed the Obsessive
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ) to assess six general belief domains associated with OCD
including: inflated responsibility, overimportance of thoughts, excessive desire to control
one's own thoughts, perfectionism, overestimation of threat, and intolerance of
uncertainty (OCCWG, 1997,2001). In a psychometric validation study, factor analytic
results of the OBQ suggested that the six theoretically-derived subscales were better
understood as measuring three constructs: responsibility and threat estimation,
perfectionism and intolerance for uncertainty, and importance and control of thoughts
(OCCWG, 2005).
The OCCWG (2001) also created the Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (III), a
self-report measure that assesses how individuals interpret their intrusive thoughts. This
instrument is designed to measure specific appraisals or interpretations of recently
occurring intrusive thoughts, whereas the OBQ was developed to measure more general
trait-like beliefs related to OCD. The III contains three subscales: Importance of
Thoughts, Control of Thoughts, and Responsibility. All III items were theoretically
developed by OCCWG members. Factor analytic results of the III revealed that one factor
emerged, described generally as "negative interpretation of intrusive thoughts" (OCCWG,
2005, p. 1537). The result that the theoretically-derived subscales could not be
differentiated on an empirical basis was surprising and warranted further research.
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Ferguson, Jarry, and Jackson (2006) subjected data from university students to
confirmatory factor analyses to test the empirically-derived one-factor model of the III
and the theoretically-derived three-factor model of the III. Both models had a poor fit,
thus an exploratory analysis was undertaken and produced a 19-item two-factor structure
of the III consisting of two factors, a Responsibility factor and an Importance/Control of
Thoughts factor. This instrument is referred to as the III-19. The Responsibility factor
consists of nine items whereas the latter factor consists of ten items, five from each of the
original Importance and Control of Thoughts subscales. The Importance/Control of
Thoughts factor reflects intrusive thought appraisals focussing on the excessive personal
significance associated with the occurrence of the thought and the perceived need to
control one's thoughts.
The finding that the Importance and Control of Thoughts subscales loaded
together on one factor was not entirely surprising based on a recent cognitive
conceptualization of OCD and empirical findings. Clark's (2004) cognitive control theory
of obsessions proposes that individuals with OCD make primary appraisals of the
occurrence of intrusive thoughts and secondary appraisals of mental control. Clark posits
that primary intrusive thought appraisals may focus on exaggerated importance of the
intrusive thought, excessive responsibility, and threat. Secondary appraisals involve
interpretations that one should be able to control what enters into their mind, therefore,
occurrences and recurrences of an unwanted intrusive thought are perceived as being
indicative of personal deficiencies in one's ability to attain mental control. That is, once
people make negative faulty appraisals of excessive importance, they tend to think that
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they should not be thinking about such thoughts and they try to control them. This theory
explains why the Importance of Thoughts and Control of Thoughts items loaded together
in the factor analysis conducted by Ferguson et al. (2006). In terms of additional
empirical support demonstrating that the Importance and Control of Thoughts appraisals
on the III are better described as measuring a single unitary construct, recall that the factor
analysis of the OBQ conducted by the OCCWG (2005) found that the Importance and
Control of Thoughts items loaded on one factor. Furthermore, in a study examining
attributions of failed thought control efforts, individuals with OCD attributed their
thought suppression failure to internal character flaws to a greater extent than did the nonclinical group (Tolin, Abramowitz, Hamlin, Foa, & Synodi, 2002), which again suggests
that appraisals of excessive personal importance coincide with appraisals of failed
thought control in the experience of OCD.
Finally, research from the directed forgetting literature may aid in understanding
how one may develop OC problems through maladaptive appraisals of importance and
mental control. Wilhelm, McNally, Baer, and Florin (1996) exposed a group of
individuals with OCD and a non-clinical group to a directed forgetting paradigm in which
participants were instructed to either remember or forget certain words presented
sequentially in a randomized order on a computer screen. The words had negative (e.g.,
violence), neutral (e.g., tables), or positive (e.g., laugh) connotations. Later, participants
completed recall and recognition tasks. Interestingly, the OCD group was less successful
at forgetting negative words (compared to positive or neutral) that they had been
instructed to forget. Tolin, Hamlin, and Foa (2002) partially replicated and extended these
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findings by using words that the OCD participants indicated were relevant to their OCD
(e.g., "dirty" or "certainty"). Findings revealed that individuals with OCD were able to
forget positive, negative, and neutral non-OCD-relevant words. However, the OCD group
experienced significant difficulty in their attempts to forget OCD-relevant negative and
positive words. The fact that OCD sufferers had little success in forgetting OCD-relevant
words suggests that such individuals may have difficulty forgetting thoughts that are
perceived as related to OCD symptoms. In terms of the development of OCD, thoughts
perceived to have relevance to OCD (i.e., perceived as important) are likely to result in
attempts to forget or suppress such thoughts (Clark, 2004). Perceived difficulties in
forgetting or suppressing the thought may result in secondary appraisals of being unable
to achieve or maintain mental control (Clark, 2004).
Developing an Experimental Design to Investigate Appraisals of Importance/Control of
Thoughts
Although there is ample correlational research suggesting that faulty appraisals of
intrusive thoughts are associated with OC symptoms, experimental research capable of
demonstrating a cause-and-effect relationship between maladaptive appraisals and OC
symptoms is much sparser. The majority of such research has focussed on manipulations
of appraisals of inflated responsibility and has found that these appraisals lead to
increases in OC symptoms (Bouchard, Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1999; Foa et al., 2001;
Ladouceur et al., 1995; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995). However, to date,
importance/control of thoughts appraisals have not been experimentally manipulated.
Two recent studies described earlier (Teachman & Clerkin, 2007; Teachman et al., 2006)
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experimentally manipulated importance of thoughts appraisals but did not assess the
mental control aspect of importance/control of thoughts appraisals. These studies also had
some limitations, for instance, the effect of the manipulation was evaluated with a single
measure that may not be sensitive to state effects. Furthermore, there was an absence of
any state measures of OC symptoms. Finally, in these studies participants recalled an
intrusive thought that they had experienced in the past. This may have resulted in
participants not feeling the same way that they did when they originally had the intrusive
thought. Anxiety and distress caused by obsession-like thoughts subside over time
(Rachman et al., 1996), therefore, when participants recalled their previous intrusive
thought, it may have lacked much of its original distressing quality. Thus, it is less likely
that the intrusion would have been experienced as intensely unacceptable, nor is it likely
to have produced as much anxiety or distress as it did originally. Provoking intrusive
thoughts as part of the experimental manipulation may be an important first step in the
development of a more valid experimental design to investigate appraisals of these
thoughts. The validity of the design would be improved because it would permit
investigation of appraisals while participants are actively experiencing an obsession-like
thought. When an intrusive thought is provoked, it would likely be more salient and
produce more anxiety and distress than would recalled intrusions.
Provocation of an Intrusive Thought. Prior to investigating the effect of different
types of thought appraisals on the severity of OC symptoms one must first get participants
to experience an intrusive thought. A previous experimental study (Rachman et al., 1996),
conducted to examine the effects of neutralizing intrusive thoughts, used an ingenious
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design to provoke an obsession-like intrusive thought. In Rachman et al.'s study, the
experimenter asked participants to think about a close friend or relative and then
instructed them to complete the following sentence by inserting that person's name in the
blank: "I hope

is in a car accident" (p. 891). Participants' anxiety level, recorded

on a Visual Analogue Scale from "0" to "100", significantly increased from 14.6 to 67.4
after this sentence completion task [>(62) = 24.6,p. < 0.001].
Importance of Thoughts Manipulation. The sentence task designed by Rachman et
al. (1996) was deemed to be particularly distressing for individuals prone to the thoughtaction fusion (TAF) cognitive bias. TAF has been defined as the "tendency for
individuals to assume that certain thoughts either imply the immorality of their character
or increase the likelihood of catastrophic events" (Berle & Starcevic, 2005, p. 263). Thus,
it has two components: (1) the belief that thinking about an adverse event makes it more
likely to occur (referred to as "TAF Likelihood"), and (2) the belief that thinking an
immoral thought is equivalent to actually carrying out an immoral action (referred to as
"TAF Moral"; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996). The two types of TAF appear to
have relevance to the types of intrusive thought appraisals that were previously described.
For example, TAF Likelihood assumptions, which focus on the likelihood that an event
will occur, have relevance to appraisals of responsibility whereby individuals are
focussed on preventing an adverse real-world event from occurring. TAF Moral has the
most relevance to importance/control of thoughts appraisals (specifically the
"importance" aspect) because the appraisals are more focussed on the immorality
associated with having the unwanted thought, rather than on the likelihood of the feared
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event actually occurring in the real world. Thus, it stands to reason that an experimental
procedure encouraging participants to make TAF Moral assumptions will be effective in
increasing appraisals of the importance of thoughts. This method is consistent with that
used in Teachman et al. (2006) in which the experimenter in the "importance" condition
told participants that their intrusive thoughts were important and revealing of their
character.
Control of Thoughts Manipulation. To develop an experimental manipulation that
incorporates the mental control aspect of importance/control of thoughts appraisals, it is
beneficial to examine preexisting literature on thought suppression. Upon experiencing an
intrusive thought, many people try to suppress it for the very reason that it is unpleasant
and they would rather not think about it. Additionally, it is prudent to recall Clark and
Purdon's (1993) theory that proposes that individuals who are prone to developing OCD
have dysfunctional thought control beliefs in which they think that they should be in
control of what enters their minds at all times. To these individuals, the presence of an
intrusive thought indicates that they are not in control of their minds and they attempt to
seek mental control via suppression of the disturbing thought. Hence, thought suppression
may be a fruitful avenue to explore when attempting to create manipulations of the
control aspect of importance/control of thoughts appraisals. Unfortunately, the thought
suppression literature has very mixed findings related to immediate and rebound ironic
effects of thought suppression (see Purdon (1999) and Rassin, Merkelbach, and Muris
(2000) for more comprehensive reviews of the thought suppression literature).
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In the seminal research by Wegner et al. (1987), non-clinical participants were
asked to verbalize their thoughts for two five-minute periods. One group was instructed to
try not to think of a "white bear" during the first period, and later they where instructed to
try to think about the bear as much as possible for a second monitoring period (initial
suppression group). Participants were instructed to ring a bell each time they thought of a
white bear. The other group was instructed to think about a white bear as much as
possible during the first five-minute period and then to try to not think about a white bear
during the second period (initial expression group). Although no effect of thought
suppression was found in period one (no immediate enhancement effect), participants
who initially suppressed the intrusive thought had more frequent occurrences of the target
thought in the second five-minute period than did those in the initial expression group (a
rebound effect). However, findings from Lavy and van den Hout (1990) did suggest that
thought suppression had an immediate paradoxical effect. These researchers had one
group of participants suppress the thought of "vehicles" whereas another group were
instructed to think about whatever they wanted, including "vehicles." Participants in the
suppression group reported significantly more thoughts of vehicles than did those in the
non-suppression group. Clark, Ball, and Pape (1991) conducted a study to further
investigate the effects of thought suppression. All participants listened to a story and then
one group was instructed to suppress details of the story. One of the control groups was
simply instructed to think about anything that they wished to think about and the second
control group was told to think about anything they wanted to, including thoughts of the
story. The suppression group reported fewer thoughts of the story than did the control
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groups during the initial monitoring period (no immediate enhancement effect). Later, all
participants were instructed to think about anything they wanted. This time a rebound
effect was found in that the group that had initially suppressed the details of the story
reported more frequent thoughts about the story than did controls.
In the above studies the thoughts to be suppressed were neutral (e.g., a white
bear). Obsessions are not neutral, they are unwanted and intrusive. Thus, to investigate
thought suppression in relation to OCD it may be more valid to use target thoughts that
possess the ego-dystonic quality of obsessional thoughts. Salkovskis and Campbell
(1994) suggest that intrusive thoughts have an impact on one's emotions which may
influence the manner in which they are processed. These researchers had non-clinical
participants identify an intrusive thought that they had experienced during the previous
month. Participants were given instructions to either suppress their intrusive thought,
simply monitor the occurrence of their intrusive thought, suppress the intrusive thought
and engage in distraction (no specific distraction task mentioned), suppress the intrusive
thought and not engage in distraction, or suppress the thought and engage in a specific
distraction task that was recommended. Participants recorded occurrences of their own
intrusive thoughts by clicking a counter. In a second period, participants were instructed
to think about anything, and to again record occurrences of their intrusive thought.
Overall, the results indicated that the suppression groups experienced more intrusive
thoughts than the control group (who were asked to simply monitor and record
occurrences of their intrusive thoughts) during both periods. Salkovskis and Campbell
stated that no evidence of a rebound effect was found because thought frequency was not
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higher in any of the experimental groups in the second period compared to the first. Thus,
only an immediate enhancement effect of thought suppression was found. The authors
posit that these findings differ from those of Clark, Ball, and Pape (1991), who found
evidence of a rebound effect and no immediate enhancement effect, because these
targeted thoughts to be suppressed were "emotionally valanced and personally relevant"
(Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994, p. 6). The targeted thoughts in Salkovskis and
Campbell's (1994) study clearly have more relevance to OCD than do neutral thoughts
because people with OCD attempt to suppress unwanted intrusive thoughts, not neutral
thoughts.
In further contrasting fashion, a study conducted by Janeck and Calamari (1999)
examining the effect of thought suppression in a clinical sample of individuals with OCD
found no immediate enhancement or rebound effect of thought suppression of a
personally-relevant obsessional thought. Similarly, Purdon and Clark (2001) found no
paradoxical effects of neutral or intrusive thoughts using a non-clinical sample.
Overall, examination of the thought suppression research does not produce clear
answers. However, much of the thought suppression research had focussed on thought
frequency, which Abramowitz, Tolin, and Street (2001) point out may not be the only
important factor associated with suppression. They state, "Individuals with psychological
disorders may respond to thought suppression failure with catastrophic appraisals of the
meaning of such failure (e.g., that they are weak, bad, or dangerous)" (pp. 700-701). This
suggests that failed attempts and mental control are associated with importance
appraisals.
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An Importance/Control of Thoughts Manipulation. In order to create an
ecologically valid importance of thoughts manipulation, the sentence completion task
from Rachman et al. (1996) is excellent because it provokes an intrusive thought that
resembles an obsession. Teachman and colleagues (Teachman & Clerkin, 2007;
Teachman et al., 2006) demonstrated that appraisals of overimportance may be
experimentally manipulated by systematically varying the information that the
experimenter provides about having the intrusive thought (i.e., whether it is meaningful
or not). Therefore, manipulating importance appraisals could be achieved by first planting
an emotionally charged thought and then suggesting that having this thought is indicative
of a character flaw. Control of thoughts appraisals may be investigated in the context of a
thought suppression task. Appraisals of failed mental control are expected to occur
naturally in response to participants being unable to suppress the intrusive thought that
they are trying to suppress (due to the paradoxical effect of trying to suppress a
distressing intrusive thought). Incorporating all three of these aspects (i.e., provocation of
an intrusive thought, manipulating the feedback with regards to having the intrusive
thought, and using a thought suppression task) into one study will allow for appraisals of
importance/control of thoughts to be investigated in order to determine whether such
appraisals lead to increased symptoms of OCD. Lastly, despite arriving at a manipulation
of appraisals of importance/control of thoughts, one should also consider measuring
appraisals of inflated responsibility given the nature of the intrusive thought provocation
procedure (e.g., "I hope

is in a car accident') used by Rachman et al. (1996). That

is, without any specific instructions to do so, it is possible that participants who complete
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this procedure may make responsibility-related appraisals in which they feel responsible
to prevent the thought from happening.
Rassin (2001) used the sentence completion task used by Rachman et al. (1996) to
provoke an obsession-like thought in non-clinical participants. After this provocation
procedure, one group of participants were instructed to suppress the intrusive thought and
another group was instructed to think about anything that came to mind, including the
intrusive thought. Results did not reveal a paradoxical effect of thought suppression, nor
did individuals in the suppression condition report more distress than individuals in the
non-suppression control group. The apparent effectiveness of thought suppression in this
study may have actually been a result of participants making adaptive appraisals of the
intrusive thought. It is expected that in a sample of non-clinical participants, appraisals of
intrusions would be adaptive and intrusions would be interpreted as having little
significance. Thus, such intrusive thoughts would likely fade from consciousness like
many other unimportant thoughts or they would likely be easily suppressed. If
participants were led to appraise the occurrence of the intrusive thought as having
important personal meaning about themselves, they would be expected to have more
difficulty suppressing the thought. This would be consistent with the findings of Rassin,
Merckelbach, Muris, and Spaan (1999), who found that when individuals are given a
reason to interpret a thought (even a neutral one) as bad, attempts to suppress the thought
have a paradoxical effect resulting in an increased frequency of occurrence of the
suppressed thought. Furthermore, using a structural equation modelling approach, Rassin,
Muris, Schmidt, and Merkelbach (2000) found that TAF triggers thought suppression,
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which is associated with increases in OC symptoms in a university sample.
Lastly, in an investigation of importance/control of thoughts, it is appropriate for
the importance of thoughts manipulation to precede the control of thoughts manipulation
as this coincides with cognitive theory in which people make initial appraisals of the
occurrence of the intrusion (these may be related to overimportance, excessive
responsibility or threat) and secondary appraisals of mental control (Clark, 2004).
Purposes of the Present Research
Research Question
The purpose of the present study was to answer the following research question:
Do individuals who make appraisals of importance/control of thoughts experience more
severe levels of OC symptoms than do individuals who do not make such appraisals?
Hypothesis
Participants provided with information indicating that an intrusive thought has
negative and excessive personal importance and instructed to suppress their intrusive
thought (the importance/control of thoughts manipulation) are expected to report more
severe OC symptoms and lowered state self-esteem than will participants told that their
intrusive thought is meaningless (the Insignificance group) or those told nothing about
their intrusive thought (Control group). This prediction is consistent with cognitive theory
of OCD, which suggests that faulty intrusive thought appraisals of exaggerated
importance lead to the development and persistence of obsessive-compulsive problems.
The participants exposed to the Suppression manipulation subsequent to the Importance
manipulation are expected to experience added distress due to the increased occurrence of
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the intrusive thought paradoxically resulting from thought suppression efforts and
consequently making interpretations about their inability to control their thoughts.
See Figure 1 for a visual representation of the hypothesis. Note that those who
will have their intrusive thought normalized and those who will be told nothing about
their intrusive thought are not expected to be significantly different because, according to
cognitive theory of OCD, healthy individuals attach little personal importance to their
mental intrusions.
Figure 1
Predicted severity level of obsessive-compulsive symptoms by experimental condition
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A sample of non-clinical undergraduate university students participated in the
present study. Such a sample is deemed suitable for research examining aspects of
obsessional thinking because OC symptoms are distributed on a continuum in the general
population (Gibbs, 1996; Mataix-Cols, Vallejo, Sanchez-Turet, 2000) and clinical and
non-clinical OC features vary quantitatively, as opposed to qualitatively (de Silva, 2003;
Rachman & de Silva, 1978).
Chapter II
METHOD
Participant Numbers and Characteristics
One-hundred and ninety-two undergraduate students enrolled in at least one
psychology course received a bonus mark towards the psychology course of their choice
in exchange for their participation in the present study. Thirty-seven failed at least one of
the screening measures (see below) and were excluded. Nine refused to complete the
intrusive thought provocation procedure and also were excluded from the study. Of the
remaining participants (N = 146), 25 participants' data were excluded from the analyses
as they reported in the debriefing session that they did not believe the importance
manipulation. Finally, one individual was excluded from the study after experiencing
extreme distress following the importance manipulation. In that case, the study was
discontinued immediately and the person was debriefed about the true nature and purpose
of the study. The age of the remaining 120 participants ranged from 18 to 50, with a mean
of 23.07 (SD = 5.76). The sample was predominantly female (85%). In terms of ethnicity,
the sample consisted of 81 (67.5%) Caucasians, 13 (10.8%) Europeans, 14 (11.7%)
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Asians, 4 (3.3%) African-Canadians, and 8 (6.7%) selected "Other."
Overall Design
This is a 3 x 2 factorial design with three levels of importance (Importance,
Insignificance, or Control) and two levels of suppression instruction (Suppression or
Non-Suppression). Therefore, after participants were asked to complete a task designed to
provoke an obsession-like intrusive thought, they were told that their intrusive thought
was either important, meaningless, or they were told nothing about the thought. The
information, or lack thereof, given to participants varied depending on their randomly
assigned group. Participants also were randomly assigned to either the Suppression
condition, in which they were instructed to suppress the intrusive thought, or the NonSuppression condition, in which they were instructed to think about anything that came to
their mind and to not suppress any thoughts related to the previously provoked mental
intrusion. A visual representation of this design is provided below (see Table 1).
Table 1
The experimental design

Suppression

Importance

Insignificant

Control

Participants told that
completing the task
and thinking about
the intrusive thought
is suggestive of
weaker moral values
and instructed to
suppress the thought.

Participants told that
completing the task
and thinking about
the intrusive thought
is meaningless and
instructed to suppress
the thought.

Participants told
nothing about
completing the task
and thinking about
the intrusive thought
and instructed to
suppress the thought.
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NonSuppression

Participants told that
completing the task
and thinking about
the intrusive thought
is suggestive of
weaker moral values
and instructed to not
suppress any
thoughts.

Participants told that
completing the task
and thinking about
the intrusive thought
is meaningless and
instructed to not
suppress any
thoughts.

ix

Participants told
nothing about
completing the task
and thinking about
the intrusive thought
and instructed to not
suppress any
thoughts.

Recruitment Method
Participants were recruited through the Department of Psychology's participant
pool at the University of Windsor. Students register online to be a member of the
participant pool. As part of the registration process, students complete a list of questions
posted by various researchers. This experimenter posted two questions to identify
individuals who may have been exposed to a plane crash (see below for the exact thought
provocation procedure), and therefore, identify persons that may be overly negatively
affected by the intrusive thought provocation procedure used in the present study. These
questions were: "Have you ever witnessed a plane crash (i.e., you were physically present,
as opposed to seeing or hearing about it on television or on the news)?" and "Have you
ever lost a close friend or loved one in a plane crash?". The online participant pool system
was programmed so that only those who answered "no" to these screening questions were
made aware of the present study. Individuals for whom this study was visible were falsely
informed that the purpose of the study was to examine cognitive styles and the
determinants of one's cognitive style. Individuals who signed up for the study completed
three additional screening measures during their in-laboratoiy session. These are
presented in the "Measures" section below.
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All participants were provided with a Letter of Information describing the study in
detail (see Appendix A). Each participant provided written consent (see Appendix B for
Consent Form) and were treated in accordance with the ethical principles for research
using human participants. The present study received clearance by the University of
Windsor's Research Ethics Board (REB # 06-207).
Measures
Measures that are in the public domain are included in the Appendix section.
Measures that are not available in the public domain are not presented in the Appendix
section, as per copyright laws.
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI). The BAI is a 21-item self-report scale that measures
the presence and severity of anxiety symptoms (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).
Respondents identify how much they have been bothered by each symptom in the past
week on a scale of 0 ("Not at all") to 3 ("I could barely stand it"). Total scores range from
0 to 63. Beck et al. (1988) found data from the BAI to have high internal consistency
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.92) and good test-retest reliability over a one-week period (r =
0.15, p < .001). In this study, the BAI was used to screen for pre-existing anxiety
problems. Individuals who scored at or above 26 (the low end of the "severe" range) were
excluded from participating in the present study. Internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha)
in this study was = 0.77.
Beck Depression Inventory - Second Edition (BDI-2). The BDI-2 is a self-report
scale that contains 21 items designed to measure the presence and severity of depressive
symptoms in adolescents and adults (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The latest revision of
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this inventory was developed to assess symptoms of depression based on the diagnostic
criteria for depressive disorders according to the DSM-IV. For each of the 21 items
assessing different symptoms of depression (e.g., sadness, anhedonia, and feelings of
worthlessness) participants endorse the answer choice that best describes how they have
been feeling over the past week. Each answer choice increases in severity and
corresponds to a number (ranging from 0 to 3). The total score is calculated by summing
scores for each item and ranges from 0 to 63. Beck et al. (1996) found that data collected
from the BDI-2 exhibited high internal consistency (Cronbach's alphas of 0.92 for
outpatients and 0.93 for a non-clinical sample) and excellent test-retest reliability over
one week (r = 0.93 ,p < .001). The BDI-2 was used in the present study to examine the
severity of depressive symptoms in participants. Those scoring at or above 29 (the low
end of the "severe" range) were excluded from participating in the study. Internal
consistency in this study was 0.88.
Obsessing subscale of the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory - Revised (OCI-R).
The OCI-R is an 18-item self-report scale assessing the presence and severity of OC
symptoms (Foa, Huppert et al., 2002). Foa, Huppert et al. developed a revised version of
this measure in order to improve upon the original version (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis,
Coles, & Amir, 1998) and to make it shorter. Data from the OCI-R exhibited good
internal consistency, ranging from 0.81 to 0.93 in samples of patients with OCD, social
phobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a non-clinical group (Foa, Huppert et al.,
2002). Test-retest reliability coefficients ranged from 0.74 to 0.91 in a sample of
individuals with OCD and from 0.57 to 0.87 in a non-clinical group. The OCI-R total was
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significantly correlated with other measures of OCD severity, suggesting good convergent
validity (Foa, Huppert et al.). Some problematic findings with respect to discriminant
validity were found, as the OCI-R correlated significantly with measures of depression.
However, this is common to many measures of OCD severity and may be a result of high
levels of depression found in individuals with OCD (Foa, Huppert et al.). The OCI-R
contains six subscales, however, only the three-item obsessing subscale of the OCI-R was
used in the present study. It is referred to herein as the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised - Trait (OCI-R-T) version (see Appendix C). In completing this measure,
respondents identify how much they have been bothered by intrusive thought experiences
in the past month on a scale of 0 ("Not at all") to 4 ("Extremely"). Internal consistency of
the OCI-R-T in the present study was 0.57. A state version of this scale was created (by
altering the wording slightly) in order to assess state-like symptoms of OCD. This
adapted version is referred to herein as the obsessing subscale of the ObsessiveCompulsive Inventory - Revised - State (OCI-R-S) version (see Appendix D).
Respondents complete this measure in the same manner as the OCI-R-T. Unlike the trait
version, data from the OCI-R-S in the current study was found to have high internal
consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.85).
Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (RSES). The RSES (Appendix E) is a 10-item selfreport scale designed to measure global self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965). Respondents read
each of the ten general statements about how one might feel about him or herself and are
instructed to rate each item using one of the following four answer choices: "strongly
agree," "agree," "disagree," or "strongly disagree." Data collected from the RSES have
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been found to be internally consistent (Cronbach's alpha = 0.77; Rosenberg, 1965) and
temporally stable (r = 0.85; Silber & Tippett, 1965, as cited in Wylie, 1989). Internal
consistency is this study was 0.86. The RSES was included in the questionnaire battery in
order to allow for use of trait self-esteem as a covariate in analyses to examine the effects
of the experimental manipulation while controlling for trait self-esteem (in the event that
experimental groups significantly vary in trait self-esteem).
State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES). The SSES (Appendix F) is a 20-item self-report
scale designed to measure state self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). The SSES
contains 20 statements and respondents select the response choice that best represents
how they feel about themselves at the present moment. The answer choices are on a fivepoint Likert-type scale ranging from 1 "Not at all" to 5 "Extremely." The SSES assesses
temporary changes in performance-, social-, and appearance-related self-esteem. Data
collected from the SSES have been found to be internally consistent (Cronbach's alpha =
0.92) and have moderate temporal stability (appropriate for a state measure), with testretest coefficients on the three subscales ranging from 0.48 to 0.75 (Heatherton & Polivy,
1991). Data collected from this measure have also been found to be sensitive to changes
in self-esteem in individuals following events such as test failure, negative feedback on
performance, and clinical treatment (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Internal consistency in
this study was 0.92. The SSES was used to examine whether or not individuals exposed
to importance and mental control appraisals would report lower state self-esteem than
those not exposed to these manipulations.
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Obsessive-Compulsive Distress Inventory (OCDI). The OCDI (Appendix G) was
developed for the present study to provide an ongoing measure of different aspects of OC
psychopathology such as anxiety, guilt, feelings of immorality, urges to neutralize an
intrusive thought, perceived levels of mental control, and responsibility. The OCDI is an
eight item visual analogue scale. For all items, a question is posed and underneath each
question is a continuous scale from 0 to 100 mm. Respondents are asked to place a mark
on part of the scale that represents their subjective state. The eight OCDI items are: "How
anxious do you feel right now?", "To what extent do you feel like completing the
sentence about the plane crash means something negative about your character and/or
moral values?", "To what extent do you think that you should stop thinking about the
plane crash?", "How guilty do you feel right now?", "To what extent do you feel like you
are not in control of your thoughts?", "How responsible would you feel if the event were
to happen soon?", "To what extent do you feel the urge to reduce or cancel the effects of
writing the sentence?", and "How likely do you think it is that the event will happen
soon?". OCDI items were based on those used in previous research (Rachman et al.,
1996; Rassin, 2001). OCDI items were analysed as separate variables, as opposed to
using a total score for all items.
Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (111-19). The original version of the III
(referred to as the 111-31) was developed to assess how individuals interpret intrusive
thoughts (OCCWG, 2001,2003,2005). The 31-items scale contains three subscales
reflecting the three different types of appraisals: control of thoughts, importance of
thoughts, and responsibility. Data gathered from the original III have been shown to
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exhibit good test-retest reliability, with correlation coefficients for the three subscales
ranging from 0.68 to 0.83 in an OCD sample and from 0.64 to 0.68 in a non-clinical
sample (OCCWG, 2001,2003). Cronbach's alphas, used to assess the internal
consistency of the III subscales, ranged from 0.80 and 0.96 in OCD samples and from
0.87 to 0.93 in a non-clinical sample, indicating excellent internal consistency (OCCWG,
2001, 2003). The revised version of the III (III-19; see Appendix H) was used in the
present study because it has been shown to have a valid factor structure in a university
student sample (Ferguson et al., 2006). The III-19 is comprised of two subscales:
responsibility (9 items) and importance/control of thoughts (10 items). As per the original
inventory, participants are asked to rate the extent to which they believed the item to be
true, ranging from a score of 0 "I did not believe this idea at all" to 100 "I was completely
convinced this idea was true." A total score is obtained by summing item ratings and
dividing the total by ten in order to obtain scores in a more familiar range and that are
consistent with previous research (OCCWG, 2001,2003,2005). For the purposes of this
study only, changes were made to the instructions on the 111-19. Specifically, the
instructions at the beginning of the inventory that define intrusive thoughts and state that
virtually everyone experiences them were omitted. This was necessary because in the
Importance condition, participants received different information about intrusive
thoughts, and this information would have been contradictory. Another alteration from
the original III-19 necessary for this study consisted of removing the instructions for
participants to write down two intrusive thoughts that they had previously experienced.
Instead, each participants received a personalized version of the III-19 that contained the
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intrusive thought used in this study. That is, the obsession-like thought, with the name of
the person inserted in the sentence, was already printed for each participant instead of
having them re-write the thought. That was necessary because participants in the
Importance condition had already received information that writing down the intrusive
thought, and thinking about it, is suggestive of weaker moral values or a character flaw.
Therefore, after having previously received this feedback, they may have been unwilling
to write down the sentence again. Finally, participants were instructed to complete the
items in the III-19 while keeping the intrusive thought in mind. The III-19 was used to
compare the types of maladaptive appraisals and the strength of such appraisals across the
various experimental conditions. Internal consistency in this study was 0.89 for the
importance/control of thoughts subscale and 0.91 for the responsibility subscale.
Measure of Obsessive-Compulsive Behaviour (MOCB). The MOCB (Appendix I)
is an instrument developed specifically for the present study in order to assess overt,
compulsive-like behaviour. The MOCB consists of a booklet that contains 12 pages, the
dimensions of which are 21.59 centimetres in width and 9.32 centimetres in length. Each
page is identical with a layout consisting of two columns containing 10 iterations of the
following sentence "I hope

will be in a plane crash" with the name of the person

that the participant identified during the obsession-like intrusion provocation procedure
typed in the blank space. Participants were instructed to cross out as many of the
sentences as necessary in order to reduce or cancel the effects of writing this sentence and
having the intrusive thought. They also were informed that they may only cross out one
sentence at a time. Total scores are obtained by summing the number of sentences that are
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crossed out, thus, scores range from 0 to 240.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS (Appendix J) is a
20-item self-report scale containing two subscales that measure positive and negative
affect, respectively (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS contains 20 affectrelated words such as "interested", "distressed", "excited", and "upset", and respondents
are instructed to indicate the extent to which they feel this way at the present moment on
a five-point scale ranging from 1 "Very slightly or not at all" to 5 "Extremely." Data
collected from the PANAS have been shown to be internally consistent, as evidenced by
Cronbach's alpha values of 0.89 and 0.85 on the positive and negative affect scales,
respectively (Watson et al., 1988). In this study, internal consistency for the Positive and
Negative subscales was 0.89 and 0.79, respectively. Further, the PANAS has been shown
to have adequate external validity, as it has a moderately strong correlation of 0.65 with a
measure of general distress (Watson et al.). Participants completed the PANAS following
debriefing. The PANAS was used in the present study to ensure that participants were not
experiencing significant distress upon completion of their participation in the study.
Participants also completed a demographic questionnaire (Appendix K) and three
additional questions in which they were instructed to circle the most appropriate number
based on a seven-point Likert-type scale. The first question, which was completed by
participants after experiencing the positive mood induction (see procedure below),
assessed participants' mood (e.g., negative, neutral, positive). The last two items
measured whether, and to what extent, individuals regretted participating in the study and
how worthwhile they deemed their participation to be.
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Procedure
Participants were tested individually by the principal investigator in a university
research laboratory setting. All participants were informed (falsely) that the study's
purpose was to investigate cognitive style and the determinants of this style. Then
participants completed the BAI, BDI-2, and the Obsessing subscale of the OCI-R (in a
randomized order), which were used as screening instruments. Participants scoring at or
above the cut-off scores on any of the screening measures (26 on the BAI, 29 on the BDI2, 6 on the OCI-R-T), were immediately debriefed and made aware of the true purpose of
the study. The specific BAI and BDI-2 cut-off scores were used to identify and exclude
individuals who scoring in the "severe" range according to test authors (Beck et al., 1988;
Beck et al., 1996). Individuals who scored at or above six on the OCI-R-T were excluded
from participating in this study as they were deemed to be "at risk" for obsessions (Foa,
Huppert et al., 2002). Research by Foa, Huppert et al. (2002) suggested that a cut-off
score of 21 on the entire OCI-R be used to distinguish those at risk for OCD from those
not as risk. However, in an experimental investigation of importance of thoughts
appraisals, Teachman et al. (2006) used the cut-off of 21 and they later stated that it was
overly conservative because it identified over 30 percent of their sample. J. D. Huppert
(personal communication, March 5,2006) suggested using the obsessing subscale (rather
than the OCI-R total score) and a cut-off score of 6. This is consistent with previous
research suggesting that the obsessing subscale is better than the total score at
distinguishing people at risk for OCD from non-clinical individuals (Foa, Huppert et al.).
Those who passed screening criteria completed a demographic questionnaire and the
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RSES. Upon completion of these questionnaires, the experimenter returned to the
laboratory and stated "I want to remind you that in the consentform that you signedfor
participation in this study, you were told that you may refuse to answer any questions
that you do not want to answer and that you can withdraw from the study at any time.
Your eligibility for the bonus markfor participation will remain, even if you choose to
withdraw." Then the experimenter delivered the following instructions, based on those
used by Rachman et al. (p. 891), to provoke an obsession-like intrusive thought/image:
"Keeping in mind a friend or relative who is close to you and very important to you
(pause), I would like you to write out the following sentence on this piece ofpaper
inserting the name of the person in the blank " Participants were then provided with a
pencil, blank piece of paper, and a paper with the typed sentence: "I hope

is in a

plane crash. " Note that the University of Windsor REB initially deemed a "car crash" as
being overly probable, thus, increasing the chances that the thought would be actualized
in the future. We moved instead to using a "plane crash" in this sentence task as it was
regarded as equally distressing but less likely to happen. After participants wrote the
sentence, the experimenter instructed them to "Close your eyes and think about the
situation for a few seconds." Following this intrusive thought provocation procedure,
participants received varying information depending on their randomly assigned
experimental condition. To facilitate readability and comprehension, the first letter of the
names of the experimental conditions will be capitalized throughout (e.g., Importance,
Insignificance, Control group, Suppression, and Non-Suppression). In the Importance
condition, the experimenter told participants the following false information:
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"Previous research has shown that the fact that you agreed to complete the
sentence task and were willing to think about the thought of the plane crash may
provide an important window into the type of person that you really are. At some
level, completing the task and having this thought of the crash probably reflects
your personal values. Please spend a minute thinking about this new information,
in particular about how completing the task and thinking about the crash may
mean something about the kind of person that you really are deep down."
Alternatively participants in the Insignificance condition were told accurate information:
"Previous research has shown that the fact that you agreed to complete the
sentence task and were willing to think about the thought of the plane crash is
completely normal. Please note that in no way does completing the sentence and
having the thought of the crash mean anything about you as a person. Please spend
a minute thinking about this new information, in particular about how completing
the task and thinking about the crash is meaningless and does not say anything
about you as a person."
Participants in the Control condition were simply asked to sit quietly for a minute.
Depending on their experimental condition, participants were then asked to either
suppress or to not suppress the previously provoked intrusive thought. Participants in the
Suppression condition were told:
"For the next five minutes I would like you to sit quietly. You may think about
anything you like with the exception of the thought of the plane crash. Should this
thought come to mind, try as hard as you can to suppress it immediately. Please
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record any occurrences of the thought of the crash by clicking this counter
(provided by experimenter) once for each thought of the crash. It is important that
you continue in this manner throughout the five-minute period."
Participants in the Non-Suppression condition were given the following instructions:
"For the next five minutes I would like you to sit quietly. You may think about
anything you like, including the thought of the plane crash. Do not suppress any
thoughts. Should the thought of the crash come to mind you may feel an urge to
suppress it but do not. Please record any occurrences of the thought of the crash
by clicking this counter once for each thought of the crash. It is important that you
continue in this manner throughout the five-minute period."
These suppression and non-suppression instructions are based on those used in
Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) and Rassin (2001). Specifically, mentioning that
participants should not suppress any thoughts was necessary in the Non-Suppression
condition as TAF may trigger thought suppression (Rassin et al., 2000). Thus, the
sentence completion task that is likely to elicit TAF thinking might result in people
automatically attempting to suppress their thoughts if not instructed otherwise.
Additionally, Purdon and Clark (2001) found that people in a non-suppression condition
who were told to think about whatever they wanted, including the target thought, reported
as much effort to suppress as those who were instructed to suppress the target thought.
Thus, specific instructions to not suppress any thoughts, including the thought of the
plane crash, were deemed necessary.
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After the five-minute suppression or non-suppression period, participants were
asked to answer two questions on a visual analogue scale: "How much effort did you put
towards suppressing the thought of the crash?" and "During the previous five minute
period when you were left alone in the lab, approximately how much of the five minutes
did you spend thinking about the event?" They also completed a personalized version of
the III-19, in which the sentence that the participant completed earlier (i.e., "I hope
is in a plane crash") was included. Participants also completed the obsessing
subscale of the OCI-R-S, the SSES, and the OCDI, which were all administered in a
randomized order. Following completion of these questionnaires, participants completed
a personalized version of the MOCB in which the sentence about the plane crash, that the
participant completed earlier, was printed 240 times in a 12-page booklet. Participants
were instructed to cross out (one at a time) as many of the sentences as they wish in order
to reduce or cancel the effects of writing the sentence.
Participants were then given a positive mood induction task used in previous
research (Eich & Metcalfe, 1989; Mitchell, DiBartolo, Brown, & Barlow, 1998).
Participants were told "Now I'm going to have you listen to a selection of classical music
that should help you develop a happy mood. However, music alone cannot create the
desired affect, so you should try to think of something that makes you happy. You may
find it especially helpful to concentrate on happy events that you have experienced
personally. " The selection of music was Mozart's Divertimento No. 136, an
approximately 4-minute long piece, which has been shown to successfully induce positive
mood (Eich & Metcalfe, 1989; Mitchell et al., 1998). The experimenter then started the
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music on the stereo and left the room. The experimenter returned to the lab and asked
participants to indicate how their mood was at the present moment, using a seven-point
Likert-type scale. The experimenter then provided thorough debriefing during which
participants were informed of the true purpose of the study, the need for the deception,
and that intrusive thoughts are a universal phenomenon that do not reveal anything about
one's character. See Appendix L for the deception debriefing script used in the present
study. Finally, the experimenter then left the lab while participants completed the PANAS
and two additional seven-point Likert-type items assessing their degree of regret, if any,
in participating in the present study, and how worthwhile they felt it was to participate in
the study.
Approach to Data Analysis
The main analysis is a 3 x 2 factorial design with three levels of importance
(Importance, Insignificance, or Control) and two levels of suppression instruction
(Suppression or Non-Suppression). Analyses were performed using SPSS 15 and 16 for
Windows. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to examine the
main self-report dependent variables. The MANOVA test was deemed preferable to
conducting several ANOVAs for two reasons. Firstly, the latter method would result in an
increase of the familywise error rate, whereas conducting a MANOVA prevents inflation
of type I error rate (Field, 2000). Secondly, using MANOVA increases the chances of
detecting an effect because it is capable of determining whether groups differ on a
combination of dependent variables (Field, 2000; Grice & Iwasaki, 2007).
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To facilitate interpretation, a new dependent variable was created using the raw
discriminant function coefficients produced in the MANOVA results. This new variable
represents a linear combination of all the dependent variables and has the capability of
maximally distinguishing between experimental groups (Grice & Iwasaki, 2007; Huberty
& Olejnick, 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Then, Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests were
conducted on the new multivariate composite dependent variable. Finally, standardized
discriminant function coefficients, and to a lesser extent, structure coefficients were
examined for interpretation (Grice & Iwasaki, 2007). This analytic procedure
acknowledges the potential relationships between dependent variables, as opposed to
examining dependent variables individually (Field, 2000; Grice & Iwasaki, 2007). As
Grice and Iwasaki (2007) state, "the multivariate information from a MANOVA is
contained in the linear combinations of dependent variables that are generated from the
analysis" (p. 203). To facilitate further understanding of the individual dependent
variables, univariate ANOVAs were also conducted and followed by Tukey's HSD posthoc tests.
Data were screened prior to analyses to assess for outliers. There were several
univariate outliers on the OCDI item assessing the likelihood that the event will happen.
This variable also was positively skewed and as a result, a square root transformation was
applied. Following transformation, two outliers remained. These scores were reduced to
one value larger than the next highest value (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), making them
within three standard deviations from the mean. No additional univariate outliers were
found. The Mahalanobis' distance procedure revealed no multivariate outliers. Square
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root transformation was applied to the two OCDI items assessing the severity of anxiety
and perceived control of thoughts, the 111-19 total score, and the III-19 responsibility
subscale, because histograms revealed positively skewed distributions. The
transformations improved normality for all variables. The importance/control of thoughts
subscale scores and the number of thought occurrences during the suppression or nonsuppression period also were positively skewed and were subjected to logarithmic
transformations, which improved normality. OCDI items about belief that one should
stop thinking about the intrusive thought and the severity of the urge to neutralize the
intrusion had moderate negative skewness. The OCDI item assessing participants' level
of guilt and the obsessing subscale of the OCI-R-S had slightly positively skewed
distributions. Transformations on all of these variables failed to improve normality,
therefore, the untransformed versions were used in the analyses. ANOVA is robust
against violations of normality when cell sizes are approximately 20 or more (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2001), which is the case here with cell sizes of 20. Further, the Wilks' lambda
test statistic used in the present study is quite robust in the event of violations of
multivariate normality (Field, 2000). Effect sizes for MANOVA were calculated using
the "1 - Wilks' Lambda" formula, partial omega squared was used to measure effect sizes
from all ANOVAs, and Cohen's d (1992) was used for t-tests.
The OCDI item assessing one's perceived responsibility for the event were it to
happen soon had a u-shaped distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (119) = .144, p =
.000) and was excluded from analyses. The MOCB also was found to have a u-shaped
distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (119) = .288,/? = .000). Normality could not
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be restored adequately via transformation. Therefore, a non-parametric test (i.e., chisquare) was used to analyse these data. The chi-square analysis compared individuals who
did not cross out any sentences with those who crossed out one or more sentences in each
of the three importance groups (i.e., Importance, Insignificance, Control group). This data
analytic decision was made on a theoretical basis such that crossing out one or more
sentences represents neutralizing behaviour whereas refraining from doing so does not.
Unfortunately, the limitation of this analysis is that it does not examine the range of
scores, that is, it ignores differences between those who may have crossed out one
sentence and those who crossed out more than one.
Chapter III
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Through random assignment, levels of anxiety, depression, obsessive tendency,
and trait self-esteem were expected to be evenly distributed across experimental groups.
To assess this, separate two by three analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted with
importance manipulation (Importance, Insignificance, and Control) and suppression
instruction (Suppression and Non-Suppression) on the BAI, BDI-2, OCI-R-T obsessing
subscale, and RSES. Results indicated no significant main effect of the importance, F(2,
114) = 0.19,p = .83, to2 = .00, or suppression manipulations, F(l, 114) = 0.85,p = .36, co2
= .00, on the BAI. Similarly, there were no significant main effects of importance, F(2,
114) = 032,p = .73, co2 = .00, or suppression, F(l, 114) = 2.35,p = .13, to2 = .01, on the
BDI-2. There also were no significant main effects of importance, F(2,114) = 1.54, p =
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.22, w2 = .01, or suppression, F( 1, 114) = 0.60, p = .44, co2 = .00, on the OCI-R-T
obsessing subscale. Finally, on the RSES, there was no significant main effect of
importance, F(2,114) = 0.43, p = .65, <o2 = .00, but there was a main effect of
suppression, F(l, 114) = 4.40,p = .04, co2 = .03. However, when using the Bonferroni
method to account for the family-wise error rate (i.e., newp value of .0125), there was no
significant difference (see Table 2 for pre-manipulation scores by condition). Because of
these findings, the RSES was not used as a covariate in any of the analyses. Further, chisquare analyses conducted to examine the composition of experimental groups revealed
no differences on gender, %2(2) = 2.75, p = .25, or ethnicity, %2(10) = 9.25, p = .51.
Table 2
Pre-manipulation group scores on anxiety, depression, self-esteem, and obsessing
Importance manipulation
Importance
M

SD

Insignificance
M

SD

Control
M

SD

Beck Anxiety Inventory
Suppression

9.75

4.69

7.45

4.70

8.60

5.17

NonSuppression

9.20

6.01

10.20

5.60

9.09

5.66

Beck Depression Inventory-2
Suppression

7.77

4.02

6.55

4.41

7.75

7.28

Non-

7.35

4.52

10.30

5.27

8.70

4.37

Suppression

Obsessive Compulsive Inventory - Revised - Obsessing Subscale Trait
1.75

Suppression

1.62

1.85

1.66

2.30

1.63
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Importance manipulation
Importance

NonSuppression

Insignificance

Control

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

1.70

1.78

2.50

1.61

2.40

1.57

Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale
Suppression

32.65

3.88

34.25

Non33.40
3.35
31.15
Suppression
Note. M= mean; SD = standard deviation. N= 120.

3.93

33.30

4.09

4.48

31.13

3.79

Manipulation Checks
To assess the impact of the importance manipulation, an ANOVA was conducted
using the following visual analogue scale item: "To what extent do you feel like
completing the sentence about the plane crash means something negative about your
character and/or moral values?" The results indicated a significant difference between
experimental groups, F(2,117) = 4.61, p = .01 w2 = .06. Post-hoc analyses revealed
significantly higher ratings in the Importance group (M — 52.43, SD — 26.76) than in the
Insignificance group (M = 30.95, SD = 30.73; p = .01). However, there was no
significant differences between the Importance group and the Control group (M = 42.30,
SD = 36.65; p = .33) or between the Insignificance group and Control group (p = .25). All
told, the importance manipulation was generally successful at creating a difference in the
extent to which individuals made faulty appraisals of excessive personal importance
compared to those who had their intrusive thought normalized. However, the lack of
difference between the Importance group and the Control group revealed that the
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importance manipulation was not entirely successful. This finding was unexpected and
will be discussed below.
An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine whether individuals in
the Suppression condition made stronger efforts to suppress their intrusive thought than
did those in the Non-Suppression group. Results indicated that the Suppression group (M
= 63.98, SD = 27.07) reported significantly higher effort to suppress the intrusive thought,
<118) = 3.44, p = .00, effect size = .42, than did the Non-Suppression group (M = 47.70,
SD = 24.73).
Main Analyses
A 3 x 2 MANOVA with importance (Importance, Insignificance, or Control) and
suppression (Suppression or Non-Suppression) was conducted to assess the impact of
importance/control of thoughts appraisals and suppression efforts on anxiety, obsessing,
and OC-type appraisals. The following eight variables were used as dependent variables:
OCDI items, "How anxious do you feel right now?", "To what extent do you think that
you should stop thinking about the plane crash?", "How guilty do you feel right now?",
"To what extent do you feel like you are not in control of your thoughts?", and "To what
extent do you feel the urge to reduce or cancel the effects of writing the sentence?", the
importance/control of thoughts subscale of the III-19, the obsessing subscale of the OCIR-S, and the number of thought occurrences during the suppression or non-suppression
period. The three items of the OCDI that were excluded from inclusion in the MANOVA
were the item used previously to assess the effectiveness of the importance manipulation
and the two items that have more relevance to responsibility appraisals (as opposed to
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importance or mental control appraisals). Similarly, only the importance/control of
thoughts subscale of the III-19 was included in the MANOVA as the primary focus of this
study was to examine these type of appraisals and investigate the impact of such
appraisals on OC symptoms. Results indicated that Box's M test was non-significant (p =
.12) indicating that the assumption of homogeneity was met. The MANOVA showed a
main effect of importance, F(16,214) = 1.77,p = .04, effect size = .22, and a main effect
of suppression, F{8,107) = 3.38,/? = .00, effect size = .20. However, there was no
interaction effect between importance and suppression, F(16,214) = 0.73,/? = .77, effect
size = .10. Means and standard deviations for each experimental condition on all
dependent variables post-experimental manipulation are presented below in Table 3. See
Appendix M for correlations between all dependent variables.
Table 3
Means and standard deviations for dependent variables
Importance manipulation
Importance
M

SD

Insignificance
M

SD

Control
M

SD

Total
M

SD

How anxious do you feel right now?
Suppression

42.85

25.74

30.15

28.72

39.60

29.69

37.53

28.15

Non-Suppression

43.60

24.97

31.00

28.34

50.50

25.37

41.70

27.08

Total

43.22

25.03

30.58

28.17

45.05

27.81

39.62

27.58

To what extent do you think that you should stop thinking about
the plane crash?
Suppression
Non-Suppression

73.40

30.19

57.85

32.93

74.70

22.65

68.65

29.46

63.45

19.92

59.55

30.21

71.55

26.86

64.85

26.07
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Importance manipulation
Importance

Total

Insignificance

Control

Total

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

68.43

25.75

58.70

31.20

73.13

24.58

66.75

27.76

How guilty do you feel right now?
Suppression

55.90

34.42

27.75

31.16

39.10

37.18

40.92

35.71

Non-Suppression

53.95

28.16

38.20

34.70

54.45

33.80

48.87

32.70

Total

54.93

31.05

32.97

32.98

46.78

35.93

44.89

34.33

To what extent do you feel like you are not in control of your
thoughts?
Suppression
Non- Suppression
Total

46.60

24.02

27.90

25.09

50.10

31.09

41.53

28.22

40.75

24.06

28.40

26.92

51.40

25.21

40.18

26.73

43.68

23.92

28.15

25.68

50.75

27.94

40.86

27.38

How responsible would you feel if the event were to happen soon?
Suppression

61.45

35.90

47.55

37.00

57.05

43.24

55.35

38.63

Non-Suppression

56.95

28.29

42.65

31.51

63.25

28.73

54.28

30.31

Total

59.20 31.99 45.10 34.01 60.15 36.37 54.82 34.58
To what extent do you feel the urge to reduce or cancel the effects
of writing the sentence?

Suppression

72.65

25.03

38.90

36.74

58.85

36.86

56.80

35.63

Non-Suppression

56.40

31.07

49.35

36.74

53.16

33.07

52.97

33.26

Total

64.53

29.04

44.13

36.65

56.00

34.68

54.88

34.37

How likely do you think it is that the event will happen soon?
Suppression

8.00

12.26

5.00

6.47

13.45

26.46

8.82

17.32

Non-Suppression

7.40

7.58

7.95

10.16

8.15

10.75

7.83

9.44

Total

7.70

10.06

6.48

8.54

10.80

20.12

8.33

13.90

III-19 Importance/Control of Thoughts subscale
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Suppression

9.90

11.14

6.15

11.59

11.45

14.09

9.17

12.34

Non-Suppression

5.25

4.69

5.25

6.64

11.50

15.00

7.33

10.13

Total

7.58

8.76

5.70

9.33

11.48

14.37

8.25

11.28

III-19 Responsibility subscale
Suppression

19.00

18.68

13.50

20.58

17.30

21.94

16.60

20.23

Non-Suppression

12.55

13.33

12.80

13.79

23.05

13.14

16.13

14.09

Total

15.78

16.35

13.15

17.30

20.18

18.09

16.37

17.36

Measure of Obsessive Compulsive Behaviour
Suppression

92.60

99.52

35.25

72.39

69.40

103.4

65.75

94.25

Non-Suppression

75.55

99.53

83.35

94.48

85.80

95.34

81.57

94.93

Total

84.07

98.62

59.30

86.57

77.60

98.50

73.66

94.52

Number of thought occurrences
Suppression

11.30

10.58

5.15

3.31

8.35

5.02

8.27

7.36

Non-Suppression

11.85

7.97

10.00

5.53

11.45

7.42

11.10

6.97

Total

11.58

9.25

7.58

5.12

9.90

6.44

9.68

7.28

Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory - Revised - Obsessing Subscale
State version
Suppression

4.70

2.49

2.70

2.99

5.00

3.66

4.13

3.20

Non-Suppression

3.50

3.00

3.25

1.74

4.25

2.43

3.67

2.44

Total

4.10

2.79

2.98

2.43

4.63

3.08

3.90

2.84

State Self-Esteem Scale -Total
Suppression

73.05

11.66

79.05

11.16

73.95

13.91

75.35

12.38

Non-Suppression

77.95

8.66

69.05

16.20

68.89

8.78

71.96

12.32

75.50 10.44 74.05 14.63
Total
Note. M= mean; SD = standard deviation. N= 120.

71.42

11.76

73.66

12.41

Main effect of importance
The approach to interpretation of MANOVA findings recommended by Huberty
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and Olejnick (2006) was used to further examine of the significant multivariate effects.
As explained above, a new variable was created using the raw discriminant function
coefficients produced by the MANOVA. These raw discriminant function coefficients
(presented in Table 4) were used for the sole purpose of creating this new variable.
Table 4
Raw discriminant function coefficients for importance main effect
Dependent Variable

Importance

How anxious do you feel right now? (t)

0.05455

To what extent do you think that you should stop thinking about the
plane crash?

0.00890

How guilty do you feel right now?

-0.00217

To what extent do you feel like you are not in control of your
thoughts? (t)

0.29708

To what extent do you feel the urge to reduce or cancel the effects
of writing the sentence?

0.00420

Ill-19 Importance/Control of Thoughts subscale (t)

0.27039

OCI-R-S Obsessing subscale

-0.02207

Number of thought occurrences (t)
Note, (t) = transformed variable.

0.74022

To obtain post-hoc tests, an ANOVA was conducted with importance
(Importance, Insignificance, Control) as the independent variable and the multivariate
composite variable as the dependent variable. This ANOVA was significant, F(2,117) =
10.89,/? = .00, GO2 = .14, such that those in the Importance (M= 3.83; SD = 0.80) and
Control (M= 3.96; SD = 1.06) conditions reported more severe OC symptoms than did
those in the Insignificance (M= 3.00; SD = 1.09) condition (p < .001 for both
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comparisons). There was no difference in the severity of OC symptoms endorsed by those
in the Importance and Control groups (p = .83). See Figure 2 for a visual representation of
the means by experimental condition.
Figure 2
Importance, Insignificance, and Control group means on multivariate composite variable
assessing obsessive-compulsive symptoms

4.5
4
3.5
3
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1.5

1
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The standard discriminant function coefficients, and to a lesser extent, the
structure coefficients were used for further interpretation (Grice & Iwasaki, 2007). The
dependent variables that maximally discriminate individuals who scored high on the
multivariate composite from those who scored lower are those that have the largest
standardized discriminant function coefficients. Observation of these coefficients in Table
5 reveal that one item in particular is most influential in discriminating the Importance
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and Control groups from the Insignificance group. That item is the OCDI item "To what
extent do you feel like you are not in control of your thoughts?" To a considerably lesser
degree, the next most influential items are the OCDI item "To what extent do you think
that you should stop thinking about the plane crash?" and the number of thoughts
experienced during the thought suppression period. The size of the standardized
discriminant function and structure coefficients on the remaining variables suggests that
all of the remaining dependent variables are useful in discriminating between
experimental conditions in the above mentioned pattern (i.e., Importance and Control
group scoring significantly higher than the Insignificance group), but to a lesser extent.
Table 5
Standardized and structure coefficients for importance main effect
Dependent Variable

Standardized
Discriminant
Function
Coefficients

Structure
Coefficients

How anxious do you feel right now? (t)

0.13439

0.63955

To what extent do you think that you should stop
thinking about the plane crash?

0.24473

0.50601

How guilty do you feel right now?

-.0.07228

0.56236

To what extent do you feel like you are not in control
of your thoughts? (t)

0.67959

0.91600

To what extent do you feel the urge to reduce or cancel
the effects of writing the sentence?

0.14088

0.50103

Ill-19 Importance/Control of Thoughts subscale (t)

0.13730

0.53945

OCI-R-S Obsessing subscale

-0.06141

0.57408

0.19412

0.50979

Number of thought occurrences (t)
Note, (t) = transformed variable.
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As mentioned above, conducting univariate ANOVAs to follow-up on significant
MANOVA findings ignores the multivariate nature of the initial analysis. Nevertheless,
this practice is common in the literature (for further elaboration, see Grice & Iwasaki,
2007). Thus, for interpretive purposes, univariate ANOVAs are reported below. One
ANOVA revealed a main effect of importance on the anxiety OCDI item (transformed
variable), F(2,114) = 4.46, p = .01, w2 = .05, such that those in the Importance and
Control conditions reported feeling significantly more anxious than did those in the
Insignificance condition. There also was a significant main effect of importance on the
transformed OCDI item assessing perceived lack of control over thoughts, F(2,114) =
9.04, p = .00, a)2 = .12, again with participants in the Importance and Control conditions
reporting feeling less control over their thoughts than did those in the Insignificance
condition. A main effect of importance was present on the OCDI item measuring
participants' feelings of guilt, F(2,114) = 4.43, p = .01, o>2 = .05, such that the
Importance group reported feeling significantly more guilty than did the Insignificance
group. There was a main effect of importance on the OCDI item assessing the urge to
reduce or cancel the effects of writing the sentence, F(2,114) = 3.14, p = .03, co2 = .04,
such that the Importance condition participants reported greater urges to reduce or cancel
the effects of writing the sentence about the plane crash than did those in the
Insignificance condition. There was a main effect of importance on the transformed III-l 9
importance/control of thoughts subscale, F(2,114) = 3.15, p = .05, (o2 = .03, such that the
Control group was found to have significantly greater scores than did those in the
Insignificance group. A main effect of importance was found on the OCI-R-S, F(2,114)
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= 3.67,p = .03, G)2 = .04, such that the Control group reported more severe problems with
obsessions compared to the Insignificance group. There was a main effect of the
importance manipulation on the number of thought occurrences during the suppression or
non-suppression period (transformed variable), F(2,114) = 3.06,p = .05, o>2 = .03, such
that participants in the Importance condition experienced more intrusive thoughts than
did those in the Insignificance condition. Results showed a trend toward a main effect of
importance on the OCDI item inquiring about participants' urge to stop thinking about
the intrusive thought, F(2,114) = 2.86,p = .06, co2 = .03, such that participants in the
Control condition reported greater urges to discontinue thinking about the thought than
did those in the Insignificance condition. See Table 6 for means and standard deviations
for each of these obsessive-compulsive symptoms, as well as significance levels from
Tukey's HSD post-hoc analyses conducted to investigate significant main effects of
importance.
Table 6
Effect of importance manipulation on obsessive-compulsive symptoms
Importance manipulation
Dependent variable

Importance

Insignificance

Control

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

How anxious do you feel
right now? (t)

6.24c

2.10

4.82d

2.74

6.25c

2.48

To what extent do you
think that you should stop
thinking about the plane
crash?

68.40

25.80

58.70d

31.20

73.13c

24.60
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How guilty do you feel
right now?

54.93a

31.10

32.98b

34.00

46.80

35.90

To what extent do you feel
like you are not in control
of your thoughts? (t)

6.34a

1.90

4.69b

2.52

6.74a

2.33

To what extent do you feel
the urge to reduce or
cancel the effects of
writing the sentence?

64.53c

29.00

44.13d

36.70

56.00

34.70

Ill-19 Importance/Control
of Thoughts subscale (t)

0.73

0.44

0.52d

0.50

0.80c

0.56

OCI-R-S Obsessing
subscale

4.10

2.79

2.98d

2.43

4.63c

3.09

6.34e
0.31
0.97
0.25
Number of thought
0.86 f
0.26
occurrences (t)
Note. M= mean; SD = standard deviation; (t) = transformed variable. N= 120. Means in
the same row that have different subscripts differ at: a-b =p < .01, c-d =p < .05, e-f=/? =
.057.
Finally, a 3 x 2 ANOVA with importance (Importance, Insignificance, or Control)
and suppression (Suppression or Non-Suppression) was conducted to investigate any
potential group differences on state self-esteem. Results of the analysis revealed no main
effect of importance, F(2,114) = 1.14,/? = .32, or suppression, F( 1,114) = 2.46,/? = .12,
however, there was an interaction, F(2,114) = 4.01,/? = .02. See Figure 3 for a visual
representation of the interaction. T-tests were conducted to facilitate interpretation of the
interaction. In the Insignificance group, t-test results indicated that the Suppression group
(M= 79.05; SD = 11.16) reported higher self-esteem than did the Non-Suppression group
(M= 69.05; SD = 16.20), t(38) = 2.27,/? = .03, effect size = 74. This finding is surprising
given that we know from the other findings that people in the Insignificance condition
experienced relatively minor distress related to the experimental manipulation, and it was
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unexpected that these individuals' self-esteem would be impacted by suppression or nonsuppression instructions. No significant difference was found between Suppression (M=
73.05; SD = 11.66) and Non-Suppression (M= 77.95; SD = 8.66) in the Importance
condition, f(38) = 1.51,/? = .14, effect size = .49. In the Suppression group, results
revealed no significant difference, f(38) = 1.66,/? = .11, effect size = .54, between the
Importance group (M= 73.05; SD = 11.66) and Insignificance group (M= 79.05; SD
11.16). However, in the Non-Suppression group, results indicate a significant difference,
t(38) = -2.17,/? = .04, effect size = .70, between the Importance group (M= 77.95; SD =
8.66) and Insignificance group (M= 69.05; SD = 16.20). This finding that, in the NonSuppression group, people who were made to feel poorly about their intrusive thought
reported higher states self-esteem than those who had their intrusions normalized was
surprising and unclear from a theoretical perspective. Overall these additional t-tests do
not appear to provide further clarity in understanding this interaction. These results will
be discussed further below.
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Figure 3
State Self-Esteem Scale means by experimental condition
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Main effect of suppression
The standardized discriminant function coefficients and the structure coefficients
for the suppression main effect (see Table 7) were examined for interpretative purposes.
Creating a new variable based on the raw discriminant function coefficients was
unnecessary in facilitating interpretation for this main effect because there are only two
comparison groups (i.e., Suppression and Non-Suppression). The dependent variables
that maximally discriminate between these experimental groups are the OCDI item "How
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guilty do you feel right now?" and the number of thought occurrences experienced during
the thought suppression period. The other variables appear to be useful in discriminating
between the experimental groups, but to a considerably lesser extent as evidenced by the
lower coefficient values.
Table 7
Standardized and structure coefficients for suppression main effect
Dependent Variable

Standardized
Discriminant
Function
Coefficients

Structure
Coefficients

How anxious do you feel right now? (t)

-0.24871

-0.18984

To what extent do you think that you should stop
thinking about the plane crash?

0.23175

0.14103

How guilty do you feel right now?

-1.03054

-0.24329

To what extent do you feel like you are not in control
of your thoughts? (t)

0.37840

0.03850

To what extent do you feel the urge to reduce or cancel
the effects of writing the sentence?

0.54444

0.11665

Ill-19 Importance/Control of Thoughts subscale (t)

0.19361

0.00760

OCI-R-S Obsessing subscale

0.52641

0.17119

-0.89045

0.56119

Number of thought occurrences (t)
Note, (t) = transformed variable.

Univariate ANOVAs also were examined to further interpret the main effect of
thought suppression. Results revealed that the only significant main effect was on the
number of thought occurrences (transformed variable) during the suppression or nonsuppression period, F(l, 114) = 9.01, p = .00, co2 = .06. Examination of the mean number
of thought occurrences between groups revealed that the Non-Suppression group
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experienced significantly more thought occurrences (M= 1.01; SD = 0.25) than did the
Suppression group (M= 0.87; SD - 0.28). This result contradicts the predicted
paradoxical effect of thought suppression. The main effect of suppression failed to reach
significance on the remaining variables of anxiety, urge to stop thinking about the
thought, guilt, perceived control over thoughts, urge to reduce or cancel the effects of
writing the sentence, the 111-19 importance/control of thoughts subscale, and the state
obsessing subscale of the OCI-R-S (all ps > .13). See Table 3 for means and standard
deviations. In this case, analysing linear combinations of dependent variables (as opposed
to only conducting univariate ANOVAs) elucidated the impact that the suppression
manipulation had on the variable assessing perceived level of guilt.
Neutralizing behaviour
In terms of compulsive-like behaviour, the mean sentences crossed out on the
MOCB by the Importance group was 84.07 (SD = 98.62), compared to 59.30 (SD =
86.57) by participants in the Insignificance condition, and 77.60 (SD = 98.50) by the
Control group. As previously noted, the MOCB was found to have a u-shaped
distribution and was unsuitable for ANOVA. Thus, a chi-square analysis was conducted
to compare individuals who failed to cross out any sentences with those who crossed out
at least one sentence in each of the three importance groups (i.e., Importance,
Insignificance, Control group). The theoretical rationale for conducting the chi-square
analysis in this particular manner is that crossing out even one sentence represents
neutralizing behaviour whereas abstaining from crossing out a sentence does not. Results
of the analysis approached significance, %2(2) = 5.255, p = .07, suggesting that more
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participants in the Importance condition and in the Control condition crossed at least one
sentence than did those in the Insignificance condition.
Exploratory analyses: Responsibility effects
Although the purpose of the experimental manipulation in the present study was
to examine the impact of importance and mental control appraisals, it is possible that the
intrusive thought provocation procedure also influenced responsibility appraisals. To
investigate this, another 3 x 2 MANOVA with importance (Importance, Insignificance, or
Control) and suppression (Suppression or Non-Suppression) was conducted. The
dependent variables used in the analysis were the responsibility subscale of the III-19 and
OCDI item, "How likely do you think it is that the event will happen soon?". The
MANOVA showed no main effect of importance, F(4,226) = 1.42, p - .23, effect size =
.05, no main effect of suppression, F(2,113) = 0.16,/? = .85, effect size = .00, and no
interaction effect between importance and suppression, F(4,226) = 1.69, p = .15, effect
size = .06. For exploratory purposes, univariate ANOVA were examined despite the nonsignificant multivariate test. The mean difference on the III-19 responsibility subscale
between Insignificance and Control group approached significance, F(2,114) = 2.84,p =
.06, suggesting that the Control group identified more severe maladaptive responsibilityrelated appraisals than did those in the Insignificance group. Table 8 displays means and
standard deviations for the dependent variables in these analyses.
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Table 8
Effect of importance manipulation on variables relevant to responsibility appraisals
Importance manipulation
Dependent variable

111-19 Responsibility subscale (t)

Importance

Insignificance

Control

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

3.37

2.13

2.87b

2.23

4.01a

2.05

How likely do you think it is that 2.05
1.89
1.92
1.70
2.24
2.17
the event will happen soon? (t)
Note. M= mean; SD = standard deviation; (t) = transformed variable. N= 120. Means in
the same row that have different subscripts differ at: a-b =p = .06.
Debriefing Results
To assess whether our debriefing procedure effectively countered increased
distress caused by the deceptive and distressing importance manipulation, data from the
PANAS were analysed. Recall that the PANAS was administered post-debriefing.
Univariate ANOVA with importance (Importance, Insignificance, or Control) revealed no
significant main effects of importance on the negative affect subscale, F(2, 117) =1.81,/?
= .17, <o2 = .03 or on the positive affect subscale, F(2,117) = 0.14,/? = .87, co2 = .00.
Further, Likert scale items (with response choices ranging from 1 to 7) assessing the
extent to which participants had regrets about participating in the study and the degree to
which they thought their participation was worthwhile also revealed no significant effects
of importance [regrets: F(2,114) = 0.01,/? = .99, to2 = .00; worthwhile: F(2,114) = 2.73,
p = .07, to2 = .03]. These findings clearly indicate that participants who were exposed to
the importance manipulation were no more distressed after debriefing than were
participants who had their intrusive thoughts normalized or who were told nothing about
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their intrusive thoughts. See Table 9 for these group means and standard deviations for
each experimental condition.
Table 9
Means and standard deviations for measures completed after debriefing
Importance manipulation
Importance
M

SD

Insignificance
M

SD

Control
M

SD

Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Negative Affect
Suppression

11.50

2.52

11.10

2.10

12.60

3.32

NonSuppression

11.90

2.92

11.05

1.36

11.65

2.28

Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Positive Affect
Suppression

29.30

9.03

30.94

10.26

28.75

6.06

NonSuppression

29.65

6.33

29.00

7.79

32.05

5.77

Level of regret for participation in study
Suppression

1.05

0.22

1.25

0.91

1.35

0.93

NonSuppression

1.35

1.35

1.10

0.31

1.05

0.22

How worthwhile was participation?
Suppression

5.85

0.99

5.60

1.19

6.35

0.99

5.60
1.47
5.30
1.30
5.75
0.85
NonSuppression
Note. M= mean; SD = standard deviation. N = 120. PANAS - N = Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule - Negative Affect; PANAS - P = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Positive Affect.
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Chapter IV
DISCUSSION
In this study, it was initially hypothesized that participants subjected to an
importance appraisal manipulation (Importance condition) of a distressing intrusive
thought would experience more severe OC symptoms than would participants told that
their intrusive thought was meaningless (Insignificance condition) or participants who
were told nothing and, therefore, were left to make their own appraisals (Control
condition). This prediction was based on the assumption that non-clinical individuals
make healthy appraisals of intrusive thoughts, meaning that they essentially do for
themselves what the experimenter did for participants in the Insignificance condition. It
also was expected that thought suppression instructions would further increase the
distress of the Importance participants by virtue of paradoxical increase in thought
occurrence. These predictions were not upheld. Instead, participants exposed to the
importance manipulation did not endorse more severe negative importance or other
mental appraisals than did those who were not given any feedback about their mental
intrusion. In fact, these two groups were remarkably similar in their overall response to
the measured dependant variables. Furthermore, the results were such that overall, both of
these groups of participants engaged in more dysfunctional appraisals and were more
distressed than were participants who received normalizing instructions in the
Insignificance condition. In terms of the thought suppression findings, there was no
paradoxical increase in the frequency of the intrusive thought.
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Clearly, the lack of difference between the Importance and Control group means
that the Importance manipulation failed. This manipulation did not succeed in making
participants engage in more severe dysfunctional importance appraisals than were
experienced by those left to themselves to make their own thought appraisals. Recall that
the importance manipulation check revealed that those in the Importance group reported
more severe importance appraisals than did those in the Insignificance condition.
However, the mean Control group score on the importance manipulation check item was
not significantly different from the means of the Importance or Insignificance groups.
Thus, although the manipulation check item was helpful in determining that the
Importance group engaged in more severe appraisals of excessive personal importance
than did the Insignificance group, the manipulation check was unhelpful in clearly
determining the type of appraisals engaged in by the Control group. As a result, the data
were examined further to facilitate interpretation.
Findings from the MANOVA indicated that the Importance and Control groups
reported significantly more severe dysfunctional appraisals and OC symptoms than did
those in the Insignificance condition. Analyses of specific dependent variables revealed
that the Control group scored higher on the importance/control of thoughts subscale of
the III-19 than did the Insignificance group, but not significantly higher than the
Importance group. This suggests that the Control group did indeed engage in importance
appraisals without being specifically provoked to do so. All told, the data suggest that the
Control group had a similar experience to that of the Importance group. This suggests that
all participants may have spontaneously engaged in maladaptive importance appraisals as
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a result of the thought induction procedure with the importance manipulation not adding
to the severity of the dysfunctional appraisal. The insignificance manipulation was clearly
successful in restructuring faulty appraisals and significantly diminishing the distress that
participants may have been experiencing as a result of the thought provocation
manipulation.
The other possible argument is that the Importance and Control group were
identical by virtue of not being distraught. If this interpretation is correct, then
participants would not have engaged in maladaptive appraisals (or would have done so to
a very limited extent) and they would not have reported experiencing any significant
amount of distress. Following from this explanation, the significant difference found
between the Importance and Control group on one hand, and the Insignificance group on
the other hand, would be a reflection of the Insignificance group feeling even better than
did the other groups due to the normalizing information they received. This explanation
of findings appears unlikely given that the Importance and Control groups reported
experiencing a moderate level of OC symptom severity, and the Insignificance group
endorsed a milder severity level of OC symptoms. If participants from all experimental
groups made healthy (neutral) appraisals of the intrusive thought, then they would have
likely all reported making adaptive appraisals and experiencing very minor or no distress.
This was not the case.
Importance manipulation
As mentioned above, the more plausible explanation for these findings is that
when not given any information about how to interpret the content of a distressing
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unwanted intrusive thought, those in the Control group did indeed engage in faulty
appraisals of excessive importance to a similar extent as did those in the Importance
group. Review of the means of the main dependent variables reveals that individuals in
the Importance and Control group tended to report engaging in dysfunctional appraisals
and they experienced moderately severe OC symptoms for a non-clinical sample. Thus, it
appears that participants in the Importance and Control groups were indeed distressed,
and as noted above, they were significantly more distressed than those in the
Insignificance condition. Although some may argue that the intrusive thought provocation
procedure was the reason for the individuals being distressed, it is argued here that a
thought can only be distressing if it is interpreted as such, a central tenet of both cognitive
theory of OCD and cognitive therapy in general.
Previous research has shown that healthy individuals engage in more adaptive
appraisals of intrusive thoughts than do individuals with OCD (OCCWG, 2003). In this
study, participants were selected to be healthy in that none endorsed any significant
problems with anxiety, depression, or obsessions in the pre-study screening. Therefore,
we expected that Control group participants, who were told nothing following the
intrusive thought induction, would spontaneously engage in adaptive appraisals and
consequently show OC symptoms roughly equivalent to those of the group who received
normalizing verbal feedback. This expectation is consistent with Rachman's (1997,1998)
theory of obsessions stating that maladaptive appraisals of the importance of intrusive
thoughts lead to increased obsessions and that the latter subside when individuals make
adaptive appraisals of intrusions, as do healthy individuals. Thus, the finding that when
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left to make their own appraisals, participants experienced OC symptoms equivalent to
those of the group made to engage in importance appraisals, combined with the fact that
the means on measures of OCD from the Importance group and Control group were both
in the moderate severity range for a non-clinical sample, challenges the proposition that
non-clinical individuals naturally engage in adaptive appraisals that protect them from
symptoms typically associated with OCD.
However, whether this proposition can be extended to all intrusive thoughts
remains an empirical question. Examination of the content of the provoked intrusive
thought used in this study may facilitate understanding of the current findings. The
intrusive thought provocation task was designed explicitly to threaten participants' view
of themselves as moral people. One could argue that the content of the planted thought
had a built in Importance appraisal component. Thoughts at odds with valued aspects of
the self have been shown to be very troubling for people in general (Rowa & Purdon,
2003), not just those with OCD tendencies. It is possible that the task used here overrode
people's naturally adaptive intrusive thought appraisals, hence the Control groups' levels
of distress being overall comparable to that of the group to whom it was suggested that
they were, in fact, immoral for engaging in this task. Again, if this is the case, then
maladaptive importance appraisals may be more common than previously thought,
especially in response to thoughts that challenge valued aspects of the self.
The main effect of importance, which revealed that the Importance and Control
groups reported more severe dysfunctional appraisals and OC symptoms than did the
Insignificance group, was interpreted by analysing the linear combinations of the

Importance and control appraisals

81

variables capable of maximally discriminating between experimental groups. Although
all variables were found to be useful in discriminating between experimental conditions,
one variable was found to be particularly influential. Specifically, the variable that best
differentiated between the Importance and Control group on one hand and the
Insignificance group on the other hand was the OCDI item, "To what extent do you feel
like you are not in control of your thoughts?" The next best dependent variable at
distinguishing the Importance and Control groups from the Insignificance group (albeit to
a considerably lesser extent) was the OCDI item, "To what extent do you think that you
should stop thinking about the plane crash?" These findings suggest that after making
faulty appraisals of overimportance, individuals in both the Importance and Control
groups engaged in more severe faulty appraisals of mental control. These findings appear
to provide support for the proposition that importance and control appraisals are
inherently combined. This is consistent with factor analytic studies findings showing that
importance and control appraisals (Ferguson et al., 2006) and beliefs (OCCWG, 2005) are
co-occurring phenomena.
A measure of compulsive behaviour was created for the present study. These types
of measures are beneficial in allowing for investigation of the impact of cognitive
manipulations on compulsive behaviours. Results revealed a trend toward significance (p
= .07) such that the Importance and Control group participants were more likely to engage
in compulsive behaviour than were Insignificance participants who had their intrusive
thought normalized. This finding suggests that appraisals of excessive personal
importance may increase compulsive behaviour.
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Contrary to expectations, there was no main effect of importance (or suppression)
on participants' reports of state self-esteem. However, there was an interaction. The lack
of main effect of importance suggests that the importance manipulation did not adversely
impact participants perceived self-worth. This result is consistent with previous research
(Teachman & Clerkin, 2007; Teachman et al., 2006) showing that the importance
manipulation did not change participants' state self-esteem ratings. The lack of changes in
state self-esteem ratings may be a result of the nature of the items that comprise the
SSES. Tests conducted to interpret the interaction failed to bring clarity to understanding
the interaction effect. It is recommended that any interpretation of the interaction be done
with tentativeness. The specific items that comprise the SSES appear to have little
relevance to OC-relevant thought appraisals and this was the only interaction found in all
of the results which, therefore, represents a different pattern of findings that it not clearly
understood from a theoretical perspective. Further, this finding may have happened by
chance or it may be some indication of measuring pre-existing self-esteem characteristics
that were different from those measured by the RSES.
Interestingly, there was a trend toward a significant finding (p = .06) such that
those who were not given any specific information about how to interpret the provoked
intrusive thought reported an increase in their perceived level of responsibility, compared
to those in the Insignificance condition. Thus, when left to make their own appraisals,
people in the Control group not only appeared to engage in faulty importance and control
appraisals, but also in maladaptive appraisals of inflated personal responsibility to prevent
a negative outcome. This suggests that certain intrusive thoughts are associated with both
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spontaneous importance/control appraisals and responsibility appraisals. The thought
provoked in this study (i.e., "I hope

is in a plane crash") was associated with

people in the Control group feeling bad about themselves for having it and increased
desire to control the thought. However, in the absence of any information about how to
interpret this thought, individuals also engaged in faulty appraisals of responsibility for
preventing this harmful thought from occurring in the real world. These thought
appraisals have been found to be related as the OCCWG (2001,2003) have noted
correlations between responsibility, importance, and control appraisals and beliefs using
data from clinical and non-clinical samples.
Suppression manipulation
When the suppression task was asked of those already exposed to appraisals of
excessive personal importance, it was expected that participants would make appraisals of
a perceived breakdown in mental control in response to experiencing a paradoxical
increase in the frequency of their intrusive thought. No paradoxical effect of thought
suppression on the frequency of the suppressed thought was found. One potential obvious
possibility for understanding the lack of paradoxical effect of thought suppression is that
non-clinical individuals may be able to suppress unpleasant thoughts reasonably well.
Indeed, using the same type of intrusive thought provocation procedure as was used in the
present study, Rassin (2001) found that suppression of a distressing thought did not lead
to increased frequency of intrusions in a non-clinical sample. Marcks and Woods (2007)
also used the same type of intrusive thought provocation procedure with a sample of nonclinical individuals and found that those who were instructed to take an acceptance-based
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approach, in which they observed their thoughts but did not try to change or suppress
them, experienced more frequent intrusions than did individuals told to suppress their
unpleasant intrusive thoughts. Purdon et al. (2005) also did not find a paradoxical effect
of suppression of participants' most upsetting intrusive thought, using a sample of
individuals with OCD. Thus, the findings of these studies suggest that individuals are
generally able to suppress their intrusive thoughts reasonably well, which is in contrast to
the findings of Wegner et al. (1987).
Interestingly though, while there was no paradoxical effect of thought suppression
on the frequency of intrusive thoughts, participants who were exposed to the importance
manipulation or given no information about their intrusive thought not only
spontaneously engaged in appraisals of excessive importance (as discussed above), but
also appraisals of faulty mental control. It was not the thought suppression instructions,
but rather the negative interpretations associated with the occurrence of the unwanted
thought, that caused participants to perceive a loss of mental control and a strong desire to
gain control over their thoughts. These findings are similar to those of Purdon et al.
(2005), who found that despite no paradoxical effect of thought suppression on the
frequency of intrusive thoughts in an OCD sample, participants' maladaptive appraisals
in response to their failed attempts to totally suppress their intrusive thoughts were
associated with heightened levels of distress and increased urges to control the thought.
As Purdon et al. (p. 105) states, "appraisals of failures in thought control, as opposed to
appraisals of thoughts in general, may be a key factor in understanding the persistence of
obsessional problems."
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Although healthy people may just be good as suppressing unpleasant thoughts,
participants in the present and above mentioned studies may have been motivated to
comply with instructions, or at least appear to be able to comply, and may have underreported the number of thought occurrences during the thought suppression task. Clearly,
demand characteristics cannot be ruled out. However, the fact that in this study, these
instructions had no effect on any of the other variables suggests that these particular
instructions genuinely did not have an immediate paradoxical effect on participants.
Normalization manipulation
The overarching purpose of research like the present study is to facilitate our
understanding of cognitive factors that are relevant to OCD in hopes that it will lead to
improved treatment protocols for the disorder. This study was carried out with this
aspiration in mind. The present findings point to the significant value of normalizing
intrusive thoughts. Recall that participants in the Insignificance group were told accurate
information stating that intrusive thoughts are normal experiences and, therefore, have no
character-related meaning. Not surprisingly, these participants reported significantly less
severe dysfunctional appraisals and OC symptoms compared to those who were falsely
told that their intrusions had negative and personally-relevant implications. Interestingly
though, those who had their intrusive thoughts normalized reported significantly less
severe dysfunctional appraisals and OC symptoms compared to those in the Control
group who were not told anything about their intrusive thoughts. These findings have two
major implications. Firstly, it suggests that providing accurate information may be very
useful in the psychological treatment of OCD. Researchers and clinicians with expertise
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in anxiety disorders are keenly aware of this and as such, this type of psychoeducation is
often a key component during the initial stages of treatment. For instance,
psychoeducational information is a central component in Barlow's (2008) unified
treatment protocol designed to provide a model of treatment for understanding and
treating all emotional disorders. Secondly, with OCD now being recognized as far more
prevalent than once thought (Antony, Downie, & Swinson, 1998; Krochmalik & Menzies,
2003), the present findings of vulnerability to spontaneous importance appraisals in nonclinical individuals points to the value of prevention efforts aimed at normalizing the
experience of intrusive thoughts, even those particularly distressing intrusions that
contradict valued aspects of the self (Rowa & Purdon, 2003).
Methodological Considerations
In this study, we chose to manipulate thought suppression as an expression of
control appraisals rather than directly inducing a control appraisal by, for example, telling
participants that they should be able to control the planted intrusive thought. The
implications of this methodological choice constitute an empirical question that could
potentially be answered with a replication comparing direct control appraisal induction
with thought suppression instructions. Furthermore, the effect of the thought suppression
instructions were measured immediately after participants received these instructions.
This methodology allowed for the investigation of possible immediate paradoxical effects
associated with thought suppression, but not for long term effects. An additional thought
monitoring period later in the experimental procedure may have revealed a rebound effect
of thought suppression. For instance, using a non-clinical sample, Clark et al. (1991)
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found no immediate enhancement effect in response to the suppression of neutral
thoughts, however, they did find a rebound effect. However, this possibility seems
unlikely given that Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) who, as in the present study, had
intrusive thoughts as the targets of suppression, found an immediate enhancement effect
and no rebound effect associated with thought suppression. Their study also was
conducted using a non-clinical sample.
Another methodological consideration that may have influenced the present
results was the manner in which the suppression and non-suppression instructions were
delivered. Those in the Non-Suppression group still reported a moderately strong effort to
suppress (48/100 on visual analogue scale). Although this level of effort was significantly
lower than that put forth by those in the Suppression condition (64/100), these overall
mean effort scores are much closer than what was originally anticipated. Perhaps efforts
at suppressing could be enhanced by strongly encouraging participants to follow the
suppression instructions. Whether these encouragements would result in greater efforts to
suppress and, therefore, in different results in reported frequency of intrusive thoughts
remains an empirical question.
Another methodological choice that may have some bearing on the interpretation
of the present findings concerns the manner in which the intrusive thought was induced.
This strategy had a behavioural component, as we instructed participants to write out a
distressing sentence that was incongruent with their true feelings. Thus, not only did
participants have an intrusive thought, they also agreed to actually write out what is
essentially a death wish for a loved one. This intrusive thought provocation procedure

Importance and control appraisals

88

was chosen to control for the type of unwanted thought participants had and to have
participants experience an obsession-like thought which, unlike the method of recalling
past intrusive thoughts (Teachman et al., 2006; Teachman et al., 2007), would retain its
distressing quality. The consequences of this component of the methodology is that one
cannot be certain that participants made actual thought appraisals as opposed to appraisals
of having performed a behaviour. Although, this procedure has long been used to provoke
intrusive, obsession-like thoughts (Rachman et al., 1996), whether its behavioural
component is meaningful also is an empirical question at this point.
In any research that requires deception and induction of distress, it is crucial to
ensure a favourable balance in the ratio of benefit to the scientific literature and the risks
to participants. The value of this type of research is in targeting and understanding
underlying causal factors leading to the development and maintenance of OCD. The
logical extension from such increased understanding of causal factors of OCD is the
development of new treatments or enhancement of existing interventions. The primary
risk associated with this type of research is that participants will be harmed by
experiencing intense distress and will leave these studies in an emotional state such that
they may be harmed by their participation in the research. Several measures were taken to
prevent this from occurring in the present study. Firstly, individuals deemed to be
particularly vulnerable to the experimental manipulation were identified via screening
procedures and excluded from participation. The individuals that did participate in the
study underwent an empirically supported positive mood induction procedure used in
previous research (Eich & Metcalfe, 1989; Mitchell et al., 1998) and then a detailed
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debriefing procedure in which they were informed of the true purpose of the study, the
need for deception, and were given a description of OCD. They also had opportunities to
ask questions throughout the debriefing procedure and were informed of community
resources available to them in the event that the study caused them ongoing distress. Data
collected from participants following the debriefing procedure revealed no group
differences between those in the Importance, Insignificance, or Control conditions,
suggesting that participants were not distressed upon completion of the study. More
broadly, it suggests that sound screening and debriefing procedures can ensure that
participants are not harmed from taking part in research that involves deception and
threats to one's ego (for further elaboration see Jarry, 2008).
Limitations and Future Research
A potential limitation to the present study is the non-clinical nature of the sample.
The value of this type of research is primarily based on the assumption that the findings
from non-clinical samples can be applied to clinical samples of individuals with
obsessive-compulsive problems. Fortunately, as mentioned earlier, individuals in the
general population have varying levels of OC symptoms (Gibbs, 1996; Mataix-Cols,
Vallejo, Sanchez-Turet, 2000) and there is empirical data suggesting that the differences
between individuals with clinical and non-clinical symptoms of OC are quantitative,
rather than qualitative (de Silva, 2003; Rachman & de Silva, 1978). In more recent
studies by Rassin and Muris (2006), the Rachman and de Silva data were both reanalysed and replicated in separate studies. The findings suggested that "the content of at
least some obsessions is diagnostic of mental illness" (Rassin & Muris, 2006, p. 1067)
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and that the landmark findings of Rachman and de Silva may have been overstated. To
the extent that additional future research suggests that qualitative differences do indeed
exist between abnormal and normal obsessions, the findings of this type of research with
non-clinical samples would have reduced external validity.
Another limitation, which is not new to thought suppression research, but should
be noted nonetheless, concerns the reliability of the measure of intrusive thought
frequency. The extent to which we can rely on participants' ability to accurately identify
and record instances when they are experiencing an intrusive thought remains to be
established.
In the context of discussing limitations, it is also useful to consider more broadbased limitations of the cognitive-behavioural models of OCD. The gold standard
treatment, based on the behavioural theory of OCD, is referred to as exposure and
response prevention (ERP; Meyer, 1966). ERP has a strong behavioural emphasis
whereby participants are repeatedly exposed to their fears and prevented from engaging in
compulsive behaviours until extinction occurs. Clark (2004) highlights several limitations
associated with ERP, which include the fact that 20-30% of individuals with OCD refuse
treatment, and of those who partake in treatment, approximately 25% fail to improve.
Additionally, Clark notes that the highly behavioural focus fails to adequately
acknowledge the maladaptive appraisals and beliefs which are clearly evident in typical
presentations of OCD and may minimize the importance of directly targeting these
cognitive aspects of the disorder. The present findings provide further support for the
notion that faulty interpretations of intrusive thoughts lead to increased severity of OC
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symptoms. The findings from the Insignificance group point to the benefits of making
healthy appraisals.
To replicate and advance the findings of the present study, a logical next step
would be to directly manipulate mental control appraisals, as opposed to control
behaviours, as was done in the present study. Although mental control appraisals that one
should control the presence of the intrusive thought were assumed to be present when
individuals were given instructions to engage in a mental control-related behaviour (i.e.,
suppression), this assumption warrants empirical investigation. More importantly,
however, is that people who were instructed to suppress their intrusive thought did not
report more severe faulty appraisals of mental control. This finding supports the notion of
using a different methodology that directly manipulates mental control appraisals, not
behaviours.
Although most experts agree that optimal treatments for OCD should include both
cognitive and behavioural elements (Huppert & Franklin, 2005, as cited in Koran, Hanna,
Hollander, Nestadt, & Simpson, 2007), the specific way in which the cognitive and
behavioural components should be combined for optimal treatment outcomes remains to
be explored. Further, the optimal combination of behavioural and cognitive treatment
techniques would likely vary with each OCD subtypes (e.g., checking, need for
symmetry, hoarders, etc). Future research to address these issues may advance the current
knowledge relevant to OCD treatment and improve treatment outcomes.
The present findings may gain in validity if considered in combination with
process and outcome studies of OCD therapy applying principles derived from the present
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findings. Indeed, the present results showed that, when left to themselves, people appear
to make maladaptive appraisals of their intrusive thoughts but that active normalization of
these thoughts by a third party greatly reduces such appraisals. Maina, Saracco, & Albert
(2006) reviewed family-focussed treatments for OCD and argue that the psychoeducation
component to OCD should be considered as having much more importance that it
currently does. They also recommend inclusion of family members in treatment to help
enrich their knowledge base about OCD and to ensure they are not acting in a way that
facilitates the persistence of the disorder. Finding a beneficial impact of the particular
component of normalizing intrusive thoughts in a dismantling study in a clinical setting
would lend further validity to data gathered with non-clinical samples such as the one
used in this study. No such studies have been conducted to date.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the present findings may have prevention
implications as normalizing individuals' intrusive thoughts in the present study
significantly reduced their level of distress and OC symptoms. Longitudinal studies
revealing lowered prevalence rates as a result of normalizing intrusive thoughts would
help to support the significance and success of such preventative efforts. The specific
information to be provided to prevent OCD and the optimal method for delineating such
information remain to be determined. However, the accurate and brief amount of
information provided to the Insignificance group in the present study suggests that simply
making people aware of the universal nature of these thoughts may result in a
considerable reduction of any OC symptoms that may have been associated with the
thought.

Importance and control appraisals

101

Summary
To provide further test of cognitive theory of OCD, an intrusive thought was
provoked and appraisals of excessive personal importance and efforts to achieve mental
control were experimentally manipulated. The impact of these manipulations on the
severity of OCD associated symptoms was investigated. The findings indicated that
individuals who were exposed to the importance manipulation, and those who were not
told anything about experiencing an intrusive thought (Control group), reported more
severe dysfunctional appraisals of importance and mental control, as well as more severe
non-specific OC symptoms such as anxiety and guilt than did the group who had their
intrusive thoughts normalized. It was hoped that faulty appraisals of mental control would
occur in response to difficulties experienced during a thought suppression task. However,
those asked to suppress their intrusive thought failed to report more severe dysfunctional
appraisals of mental control or OC symptoms than did those who were asked to not
suppress. Because the Importance group failed to endorse higher scores than the Control
group on the item that served as the importance manipulation check, it cannot be
concluded that the importance manipulation caused significant increases in the level of
dysfunctional appraisals or OC symptoms reported. However, given that the rest of the
results suggest that the Control group had a very similar experience to that of those
exposed to the importance manipulation, it was deemed legitimate to conclude that the
Control group did engage in faulty appraisals of importance. What is clear, is that when
individuals were exposed to the importance manipulation or were left to themselves to
appraise their intrusive thought, they tended to engage in more faulty appraisals of mental
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control than did those who had their intrusions normalized. This provides further support
for the notion that importance and mental control appraisals may be best described as
measuring a unitary construct. Finally, a central finding of this study is that those who had
their intrusive thoughts normalized, reported significantly less dysfunctional thought
appraisals and less severe OC symptoms compared to those who did not receive such
normalizing information. This result suggests that providing psychoeducational
information that normalizes and minimizes the importance of intrusive thoughts may be
valuable not only in OCD treatment, but also in a preventative manner to reduce
prevalence rates of the disorder.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Letter of Information
Title: An investigation of cognitive style
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Rob Ferguson, from the
Department of Psychology at the University of Windsor. Rob Ferguson is a graduate
student in the Department of Psychology and these data will contribute to his doctoral
dissertation. Dr. Josee L. Jarry, a faculty member in the Department of Psychology, is
supervising Rob Ferguson's research. If you have any questions or concerns about this
research please feel free to contact Rob Ferguson at fergusu@uwindsor.ca or (519) 2533000, ext. 4708 and/or Dr. Jarry at (519) 253-3000, ext. 2237.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of the present research is to examine the cognitive style of individuals and
the determinants of one's cognitive style.
PROCEDURES
You will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires and a sentence completion task.
Your participation will take approximately 60 minutes. This study will be conducted in
room 286-1 of the Chrysler Hall South building. If you recognize the experimenter and
you feel uncomfortable because of this, you may withdraw from the study.
Research findings will be made available to you by the Fall of 2007 through a PDF
attachment on Dr. Jarry's website.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
While thinking about certain thoughts it is possible that you may feel uncomfortable.
Please note that if you do feel uncomfortable at all, you may contact Dr. Jarry (see above
for contact information) with your concerns. If you wish to discuss your concerns with
someone unaffiliated with the study, you may contact the Student Counselling Centre at
(519) 253-3000, ext. 4616.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR SOCIETY
You may find the following study interesting as it examines the way you think. This
research will benefit the scientific community, as it will provide further insight into
people's cognitive style.
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PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
There is no payment for participating in this study, however, you will be receive 1 bonus
point towards the psychology course of your choice.
CONFIDENTIALITY
It is extremely important that you feel comfortable to answer all questions in an honest
manner. Therefore, all information obtained in this research that can be identified with
you will remain confidential and will not be disclosed unless you provide your
permission. To ensure confidentiality, do not write your name on any materials other
than the Consent Form. All of your data will be linked with a code number determined
prior to your participation and all questionnaires will be identified with this number. The
signed Consent Form will be stored separately from the raw data set, in locking filing
cabinets.
• Check here if you agree to have your data be used in subsequent studies. You
may withdraw them from subsequent use at any point in time.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You may choose whether or not to participate in this research. If you volunteer to
participate in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.
You may exercise your option of removing your data from the study. Although it is
highly desirable for research purposes that you answer all questions, you may also refuse
to answer any question(s) that you do not want to answer and still remain in the study.
The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise that warrant
doing so.
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
You may withdrawal your consent at any time and discontinue participation in this
research without any penalty. This study has been reviewed by the Research Ethics Board
at the University of Windsor and has received ethics clearance. If you have any questions
about your rights as a research participant that have not been addressed here, contact:
Research Ethics Co-ordinator
University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario
N9B 3P4

Telephone: (519) 253-3000, ext.
3916
Email: ethics@uwindsor.ca
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Appendix B
Consent Form
Title: An investigation of cognitive style
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Rob Ferguson, from the
Department of Psychology at the University of Windsor. Rob Ferguson is a graduate
student in the Department of Psychology and these data will contribute to his doctoral
dissertation. Dr. Josee L. Jarry, a faculty member in the Department of Psychology, is
supervising Rob Ferguson's research. If you have any questions or concerns about this
research please feel free to contact Rob Ferguson at fergusu@uwindsor.ca or (519) 2533000, ext. 4708 and/or Dr. Jarry at (519) 253-3000, ext. 2237.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of the present research is to examine the cognitive style of individuals and
the determinants of one's cognitive style.
PROCEDURES
You will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires and a sentence completion task.
Your participation will take approximately 60 minutes. This study will be conducted in
room 286-1 of the Chrysler Hall South building. If you recognize the experimenter and
you feel uncomfortable because of this, you may withdraw from the study.
Research findings will be made available to you by the Fall of 2007 through a
WordPerfect attachment on Dr. Jarry's website.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
While thinking about certain thoughts it is possible that you may feel uncomfortable.
Please note that if you do feel uncomfortable at all, you may contact Dr. Jarry (see above
for contact information) with your concerns. If you wish to discuss your concerns with
someone unaffiliated with the study, you may contact the Student Counselling Centre at
(519) 253-3000, ext. 4616.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR SOCIETY
You may find the following study interesting as it examines the way you think. This
research will benefit the scientific community, as it will provide further insight into
people's cognitive style.
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
There is no payment for participating in this study, however, you will be receive 1 bonus
point towards the psychology course of your choice.
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CONFIDENTIALITY
It is extremely important that you feel comfortable to answer all questions in an honest
manner. Therefore, all information obtained in this research that can be identified with
you will remain confidential and will not be disclosed unless you provide your
permission. To ensure confidentiality, do not write your name on any materials other
than the Consent Form. All of your data will be linked with a code number determined
prior to your participation and all questionnaires will be identified with this number. The
signed Consent Form will be stored separately from the raw data set, in locking filing
cabinets.
• Check here if you agree to have your data be used in subsequent studies. You
may withdraw them from subsequent use at any point in time.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You may choose whether or not to participate in this research. If you volunteer to
participate in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.
You may exercise your option of removing your data from the study. Although it is
highly desirable for research purposes that you answer all questions, you may also refuse
to answer any question(s) that you do not want to answer and still remain in the study.
The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise that warrant
doing so.
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
You may withdrawal your consent at any time and discontinue participation in this
research without any penalty. This study has been reviewed by the Research Ethics Board
at the University of Windsor and has received ethics clearance. If you have any questions
about your rights as a research participant that have not been addressed here, contact:
Research Ethics Co-ordinator
University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4

Telephone: (519) 253-3000, ext.
3916
Email: ethics@uwindsor.ca

SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study "An investigation of cognitive style"
as provided herein. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to
participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

Name of Subject

Signature of Subject

Date
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SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
In my judgement, the subject is voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent to
participate in this research study.

Signature of Investigator

Date
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Appendix C
OCI-R (T)

The following statements refer to experiences that many people may have in their
everyday lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH the experience
DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the PAST MONTH. The numbers refer to
the following verbal labels:
0
Not at all

1
A little

2
Moderately

3
A lot

A. I find it difficult to control my own thoughts.
B. I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my
mind against my will.
C. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting
rid of them.

4
Extremely
0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

0

1

2

3

4
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Appendix D
OCI-R (S)

The following statements refer to experiences that many people may have in their
everyday lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH the experience
DISTRESSES or BOTHERS you AT THIS MOMENT. The numbers refer to the
following verbal labels:
0
Not at all

1
A little

2
Moderately

3
A lot

A. I find it difficult to control my own thoughts.
B. I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that are coming into
my mind against my will.
C. I am having nasty thoughts and I am having difficulty in
getting rid of them.

4
Extremely
0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

0

1

2

3

4

Importance and control appraisals

101

Appendix E
RSES
Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. If
you strongly agree, circle SA. If you agree with the statement, circle A. If you disagree, circle
D. If you strongly disagree, circle SD.
STRONGL
Y AGREE

AGREE

DISAGREE

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

1

On the whole, I am
satisfied with myself.

SA

A

D

SD

2

At times I think I am no
good at all.

SA

A

D

SD

3

I feel that I have a
number of good
qualities.

SA

A

D

SD

4

I am able to do things as
well as most other
people.

SA

A

D

SD

5

I feel I do not have much
to be proud of.

SA

A

D

SD

6

I certainly feel useless at
times.

SA

A

D

SD

7

I feel that I'm a person
of worth, at least on an
equal plane with others.

SA

A

D

SD

8

I wish I could have more
respect for myself.

SA

A

D

SD

9

All in all, I am inclined
to feel that I am a failure.

SA

A

D

SD

10

I take a positive attitude
toward myself.

SA

A

D

SD
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Appendix F
SSES
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There
is, of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true
of yourself at this moment. Be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain
of the best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW.
Using the following scale, place a number in the box to the right of the statement that
indicates what is true for you at this moment:
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Somewhat

4
Very much

1.1 feel confident about my abilities
2.1 am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or
failure
3.1 feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now
4.1 feel frustrated or rattled about my performance
5.1 feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.
6.1 feel that others respect and admire me
7.1 am dissatisfied with my weight
8.1 feel self-conscious
9.1 feel as smart as others
10.1 feel displeased with myself.
11.1 feel good about myself.
12.1 am pleased with my appearance right now
13.1 am worried about other people think of me
14.1 feel confident that I understand things
15.1 feel inferior to others at this moment
16.1 feel unattractive
17.1 feel concerned about the impression I am making
18.1 feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.
19.1 feel like I'm not doing well
20.1 am worried about looking foolish

5
Extremely
1

2 3

4

5

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
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Appendix G
OCDI
For each of the following questions please indicate your response by drawing a vertical
line through the appropriate part of the continuum scale that reflects how you feel at this
moment.
1. How anxious do you feel right now?
0
"Not at all"

100
"Extremely"

2. To what extent do you feel like completing the sentence about the plane crash means
something negative about your character and/or moral values?
0
"Not at all"

100
"Extremely"

3. To what extent do you think that you should stop thinking about the plane crash?
0
"Not at all"

100
"Extremely"

4. How guilty do you feel right now?
0
"Not at all"

100
"Extremely"

5. To what extent do you feel like you are not in control of your thoughts?
0
"Not at all"

100
"Extremely"

6. How responsible would you feel if the event were to happen soon?
0
"Not at all"

100
"Extremely"

7. To what extent do you feel the urge to reduce or cancel the effects of writing the
sentence?
0
"Not at all"

100
"Extremely"
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8. How likely do you think it is that the event will happen soon?
0
"Not at all"

100
"Extremely"
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Appendix H
III-19
(Font reduced to comply with dissertation formatting)
We are interested in your experiences with unpleasant and unwanted thoughts or images or
impulses. The entire sentence you completed earlier, including the name of the person close to you in the
blank part of the sentence, is written in the space below.
I hope

is in a plane crash.

While keeping this unwanted intrusive thought in mind, rate how much you believe in each of the
ideas listed below. Circle the number that best represents your belief when this intrusion is occurring.
Use the following scale:
0

10

I did not believe
this idea at all

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

I was moderately
convinced this
idea was true

90

100

I was completely
convinced this
idea was true

1. Because I've thought of bad things that
might happen, I must act to prevent them.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2. Because I have this thought, it must be
important.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

3. If I don't do something about this
intrusive thought, it will be my fault if
something terrible happens.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

4. Because this thought comes from my
mind, I must want to have it.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

5. It's wrong to ignore this unwanted
thought.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

6. Because I can't control this thought, I
am a weak person.

0

10 20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

7. I cannot take the risk that this thought
will come true.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

8. Now that I've thought of something bad 0
that could go wrong, I have a responsibility
to make sure it doesn't happen.

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
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10

I did not believe
this idea at all

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

I was moderately
convinced this
idea was true

100

I was completely
convinced this
idea was true

9. Because I've had this thought, I must
want it to happen.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

10. Having this intrusive thought means
that I could lose control of my mind.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

11. I need to be certain something awful
won't happen as a result of this thought.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

12. Having this intrusive thought means
I'm out of control.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

13. Having this thought means I am weird
or abnormal.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

14. I would be irresponsible if I ignored
this intrusive thought.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

15. Having this intrusive thought means I
am a terrible person.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

16. If I don't control this unwanted
0
thought, something bad is bound to happen.

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

17. The more I think about these things,
the greater the risk they will come true.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

18. I'll feel guilty unless I do something
about this thought.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

19. If I don't control this thought, I'll be
punished.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
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MOCB
Sample first page of the MOCB:
I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.

I hope Rob is in a plane crash.
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Importance and control appraisals

101

Appendix J
The PANAS
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.
Use the following scale to record your answers.
1
very slightly
or not at all
_ interested
_ distressed
_ excited
_ upset
_ strong
_ guilty
_ scared
_ hostile
_ enthusiastic
proud
irritable
alert
ashamed
inspired
nervous
determined
attentive
jittery
active
afraid

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely
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Appendix K
Demographic Questionnaire
Age:

Sex:

Marital status:
Married/common law •

Divorced/separated •

Number of children: 0 •

ID

2D

3D

Single •
4•

•

Years in University:
First year
•
Second year
•

Hispanic
•
Native-Canadian •

Part time student

Third year
Fourth year

••

More than 4 years

•

Including your current psychology course(s), how many psychology courses
have you taken so far?
What is/are your major(s)? _
What is/are your minor(s)?
If currently employed, your occupation is:
Full time
•
Clerical
Part time
•
Professional
Owner/manager
•
Unemployed
Other:
Mother or guardian's occupation:
Full time
•
Clerical
Part time
•
Professional
Owner/manager
•
Unemployed
Other:

••
•

Labourer
•
Self-employed

•
•

Labourer
•
Self-employed

•

•

more than 4 •

What is your ethnic background?
South Asian
•
Caucasian
•
European
•
African-Canadian
•
Other (please specify):
East Asian
•
School enrolment:
Full time student

Widowed

•
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Father or guardian's occupation:
Full time
•
Clerical
Part time
•
Professional
Owner/manager
•
Unemployed
Other:

•
•

•

Labourer
•
Self-employed

•
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Appendix L
Debriefing for Deception
There is more to this study than I have told you about so far. Before I tell you
exactly what it is, I would like to know what you think this study was about. [Pause and
wait for response].
Before I tell you more about the true purpose of this study I would like to explain
why it is necessary for some kinds of psychological studies not to tell people all about the
purpose of the study at the very beginning. In some kinds of studies, if we tell people
what the purpose of the experiment is and what we predict about how they will react
under particular conditions, they might deliberately do whatever they think we want them
to do, just to help us out and give us the results that they think we want. If that happened,
their reactions would not be a good indication of how they might react in a situation in
every day life, where they didn't think they were being studied. It is also possible that the
opposite might occur and that people might think that if we predicted that they would do
a certain thing, they might deliberately not do it to show us that we can't figure them out.
This would also make the results invalid, because again, what people would be
responding to is what they thought we were looking for rather than responding naturally.
Can you see why in some studies we can't tell people all about the purpose of the study at
the beginning because it would influence the results and make the data invalid? [Pause
and give the participants a chance to ask questions or comment].
Now I would like to explain exactly what we are trying to get at in this study. We
told you that we were looking at one's cognitive style and what determines how people
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think. However, the study that you just participated in looked at the effect that faulty
interpretations of unwanted, intrusive thoughts have on the severity of obsessivecompulsive disorder (OCD) symptoms. There is much research that suggests that almost
all people experience unwanted, intrusive thoughts, which means that they are a normal
experience. Research also suggests that people with OCD experience similar types of
intrusive thoughts as people who do not have OCD. However, people with OCD
exaggerate the importance of their intrusive thoughts. For example, they night think that
having an intrusive thought means they are a bad person when in actuality, they are
having a very normal experience of intrusive thoughts. In contrast, people without OCD
tend to interpret the occurrence of intrusive thoughts as unimportant and they can easily
stop thinking about them. In this study, some people were informed that writing the
sentence about the plane crash, and having the intrusive thought of the crash, suggested
that they may have weaker moral values or a weaker character that the vast majority of
people. This is entirely untrue. It really does not mean anything about one's moral values
or character. We told others that having the intrusive thought was meaningless (the truth),
and a third group of people were not told anything about having the intrusive thought
(control group). We want to see if people who were told that having the intrusive thought
of the plane crash means that they may have weaker moral values than most people
exhibit more symptoms of OCD than those who were told that completing the sentence
task and having the intrusive thought were meaningless or those who were told nothing
about having the intrusive thought. As mentioned earlier, research findings indicate that
attaching too much importance to the occurrence of intrusive thoughts is associated with
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OCD symptoms. This study was trying to further demonstrate that making faulty
interpretations of intrusive thoughts leads one to report and demonstrate more symptoms
of OCD than those who make adaptive interpretations.
We also asked some people in the study to suppress all thoughts of the plane crash
and we asked another group to not suppress any thoughts. Research has shown that trying
to suppress distressing thoughts actually has the opposite effect, and results in an increase
in the occurrences of the thought that the person was trying to suppress. We want to see if
people who were told that having the intrusive thought of the plane crash means that they
may have weaker moral values than most people, and were asked to suppress the thought
of the plane crash, report and show more symptoms of OCD than those people in all other
conditions.
How people interpret their intrusive thoughts is important because faulty
interpretations can lead to symptoms of OCD and even a clinical diagnosis of OCD. So, it
is important for psychologists to have as much information as possible about these
interpretations that people make. That is why we are conducting this study. Do you
understand why we had to do that? Do you have any questions? [Pause and allow
participant to talk about this if they have any concerns for questions].
As in most psychological research, we are interested in how the average person
reacts in this situation. We need to test many people and combine their results in order to
get a good indication of how the average person reacts under the different conditions. In
order for us to draw any conclusions, we have to combine the data we got from you with
data we get from other people so that we have enough data to draw conclusions. What
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this means is that there will be many people participating in this study. It is going to be
necessary for us to ask you not to say anything about the study to anyone else. If you
talked to someone else about the study and told them all the things I just told you and
then they were in the study; their reactions wouldn't be spontaneous and natural, and their
results couldn't be used and combined with your data and those from other people. If that
happened, we wouldn't have enough data to make conclusions about the average person,
so the whole study really would be for nothing. I hope you can see why it is extremely
important that I ask you not to say anything about the study. You might think that it won't
make a difference if you talk to your roommate about it because they'll never be in the
study, but your roommate might say something to someone else who might be in the
study. So, I would like to ask you not to say anything about the study, other than you
completed a sentence completion task and some self-report questionnaires that examined
your thoughts at least until the end of this school year in April 2007. Would you be
comfortable telling me now that you will not tell others about the study until it is all over?
Your participation in research is very important. In a study like this where we didn't give
you all the information up front, we want to make sure you are satisfied with your
participation and that you wish to keep your data in the study. If you tell me now that you
do not want your data to be used, we will remove it from our pool of data. Do you want to
keep your data in the study, or have it removed? Do you have any questions about that?
We also want to let you know that we realize that some of the questionnaires we
asked you to complete were personal in nature. Some of them made you think about very
distressing experiences you did not want to think about. Some people might be upset after
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completing questionnaires, others will not be upset at all. Both of these responses are
perfectly normal. If you have any concerns, I really want to encourage you to discuss your
reactions with me, either now or later on. The contact information for myself and my
research advisor are included on your copy of the consent form. If you would prefer to
discuss your reactions to the study with someone else, you may contact the Student
Counseling Centre (SCC) on campus. The phone number for the SCC is also included on
the consent form. If you prefer to speak to someone off campus about this study, we can
provide you a list of community resources for which you may contact as you see fit. Your
participation in this study was very much appreciated. I hope you found your experience
of participating in this study interesting. I would be glad to answer any questions you
might have.

.43**
.18*

0.13
.34**
24**

.36**
0.1
.43**
.23*

.42**
.19*
.30**
.31**
-.36**

.38**
.23*
.29**
.26**
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R III-19 (t)

Tght Occ (t)
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.39**
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.26**

.41**
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.50**
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47**

.27**

0.07

.27**

.33**

-.32**

.35**

.34**

-.31**

.23**

.29**

0.11

.34**

.40**

0.18

-

OCDI 7

.43**

.54**

.29**

.36**

OCDI 8 (t)

.68**

.38**

.63**

.56**

-

OCDI 7

.48**

.45**

.32**

OCDI 5 (t)

.54**

-

47**

OCDI 4

OCDI 5 (t)

.76**

-

OCDI 3

.67**

44**

-

OCDI 2

OCDI 4

34**

.59**

OCDI 2

OCDI 3

-

OCDI 1 (t)

OCDI 1 (t)

Correlation Table of Dependent Variables

Appendix M
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-.30**

.21*

-0.03

0.14

.43**

34**

0.18

-

OCDI 8 (t)

-.23*

0.05

.25**

-

Tght Occ (t)

-0.1

-0.04

-

Suppress Eff

-.33**

-

MOCB

-

SSES

Note. OCDI 1 = How anxious do you feel right now?; OCDI 2 = To what extent do you feel like completing the sentence about the plane crash means
something negative about your character and/or moral values?; OCDI 3 = To what extent do you think that you should stop thinking about the plane
crash?; OCDI 4 = How guilty do you feel right now?; OCDI 5 = To what extent do you feel like you are not in control of your thoughts?; OCDI 7 = To
what extent do you feel the urge to reduce or cancel the effects of writing the sentence?; OCDI 8 = How likely do you think it is that the event will
happen soon?; OCI-R-S Ob = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory - Revised Obsessing subscale; I/C III-19 = Importance/Control of Thoughts subscale of
111-19; R111-19 = Responsibility subscale of 111-19; Tght Occ = Thought occurrences; Suppression Eff = Suppression effort; MOCB = Measure of
Obsessive Compulsive Behaviour; SSES = State Self Esteem Scale. OCDI 6 was excluded from analyses and therefore was not reported here, p <
.01**; p < .05*.
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